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Private Parties, Legislators, and the Government’s Mantle: 
On Intervention and Article III Standing 
 
By Suzanne B. Goldberg
1
 
 
Abstract 
 
This essay takes up questions regarding whether initiative proponents and 
legislators can defend a law in federal court when the government declines to 
defend.  Looking first at intervention under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I 
argue that neither has the cognizable interest needed to enter an ongoing lawsuit 
as a party.  Yet even if they are allowed to intervene, these would-be defenders of 
state or federal law cannot take on the government’s mantle to satisfy Article III 
because the government’s standing derives from the risk to its enforcement 
powers, which is an interest that cannot be delegated to others.  Nor can they 
make out any more than a desire to have the law enforced consistent with their 
views, which is the sort of generalized grievance the Supreme Court has long 
rejected as a basis for standing.   
Yet numerous courts have permitted intervention and accorded standing to 
these types of intervenors, including in the marriage cases before the Supreme 
Court in the 2012 term.  We can understand this unduly generous approach as a 
part of a larger phenomenon at the crossroads of procedure and judicial 
legitimacy.  In these high-vulnerability contexts, where courts are asked to decide 
the constitutionality of popular measures, legitimacy concerns, including what I 
term  countermajoritarian anxiety and guilt, permeate procedural decisionmaking 
and, at times, override otherwise operative procedural constraints.   
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I. Introduction 
 
 Imagine a town called Defendantville in Anystate, USA.  If ever Anystate’s 
governor and attorney general decline to defend a voter-initiated law, they can 
designate someone in Defendantville to defend the law in their stead.  None of 
Defendantville’s residents has the power to enforce the state’s laws but, for the 
limited purpose of defending those laws in court, any of them can take on the 
mantle of Anystate’s sovereignty.  Now imagine, instead, that a federal statute is 
being challenged.  The government has declined to defend, and a group of 
lawmakers steps in.  This group, too, claims the government’s mantle and seeks to 
enter the lawsuit as defendants.    
 
 The questions that prompt this Essay arise at the point when these lawsuits 
are brought in federal court:  First, can states delegate their sovereignty – and with 
it, their Article III standing – to private parties for purposes of defending their 
laws?
2
  Second, can a subset of legislators take up a measure’s defense when the 
executive branch refuses?  The first, of course, implicates what the Ninth Circuit 
permitted in Perry v. Brown, when California declined to defend Proposition 8, a 
voter-initiated measure that withdrew marriage rights from same-sex couples, and 
the court agreed to decide an appeal from the proposition’s sponsors.3  And the 
second reflects what numerous federal courts have permitted to the Bipartisan 
Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives, which stepped in when the 
Department of Justice decided no longer to defend the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA).
4
 
 
 Through attention to both doctrine and judicial legitimacy dynamics, this 
essay shows that Article III standing cannot be delegated from governments to 
individuals in this way, even when those individuals are elected officials.  The 
legal argument here proceeds in three steps.  We begin pre-constitutionally, with 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) – specifically, with an extended 
                                                          
2
  Standing is an essential element of Article III’s “bedrock” case or controversy requirement.  See 
Raines v. Byrd at 819.  For more detailed doctrinal discussion, see infra at xx. 
3
   See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (2012), cert. granted sub nom Hollingsworth v. Brown, 2012 
WL 3134429 (Mem.) (Dec. 7, 2012) (directing the parties to address “whether petitioners have 
standing under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution in this case”). 
4
  For extended discussion of BLAG and its role in the DOMA litigation, see infra at xx.  In 
granting the writ of certiorari in United States v. Windsor, the Court added this question to the 
merits-related question about DOMA’s constitutionality.  See U.S. v. Windsor, 2012 WL 4009654 
(Mem) (Dec. 7, 2012) ( directing the parties to address the question “whether the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives has Article III standing in the 
case.”). 
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discussion of Rule 24 intervention.  While Rule 24 provides the procedural entrée 
for outsiders to become parties in an ongoing lawsuit, access is restricted to those 
with cognizable interests closely related to the litigation.  Passionate commitment 
to the issue before the court does not count; for this reason, most initiative 
proponents do not qualify.  Although they invest heavily in a measure’s success, 
they typically do not experience a change to their own legal status when a measure 
passes that would translate to the sort of interest Rule 24 requires.
5
  
 
The discussion then turns to Article III.  Through an inquiry into why 
governments have standing to defend their laws, it becomes clear that government 
standing cannot be imputed to private actors or individual legislators, even when 
those actors have engaged in the lawmaking process.  When a statute is 
challenged, governments have the concrete and specific interest that basic standing 
doctrine requires
6
 because their authority to enforce their own laws is subject to 
diminishment.  Private parties and even individual legislators, by contrast, do not 
have this same stake because they do not have and cannot exercise the 
government’s enforcement power.  Consequently, governments cannot properly 
extend the Article III standing associated with their enforcement powers to these 
individuals and organizations either explicitly or by implication. 
 
Next, absent the government’s mantle, we see that most initiative 
proponents and lawmakers also cannot establish standing by the conventional 
means available to federal court litigants who seek redress for an injury.  As noted 
above, voter initiatives typically do not alter their proponents’ rights vis a vis the 
general population in a way that would give rise to a concrete, particular claim.  
This is certainly the case for Proposition 8’s promoters, whose right to marry was 
left unaffected by the measure they helped pass.  The same is true for those 
legislators who would defend DOMA, or any other measure they supported.  In 
these contexts, the grievance amounts to a demand for government to enforce its 
laws in a particular way rather for redress of an individualized injury caused by the 
government’s action.  This law enforcement claim is not particular to the 
measure’s strongest supporters.  Instead, anyone in the population might make it, 
                                                          
5
  Although the discussion here will continue for the sake of comprehensiveness and to illuminate 
synergies between intervention and standing jurisprudence, intervention law is sufficient, on its 
own, to resolve most questions about initiative promoters’ entry into litigation.   Indeed, in Perry, 
which is currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, while the plaintiffs-respondents have 
arguably waived their objection to the misapplication of Rule 24 by the lower courts, there is no bar 
to the Supreme Court resolving the case on this procedural ground.   
6
  See infra at xx.    
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which is why standing jurisprudence has long found it to be inadequate for Article 
III courts.
7
   
  
Because intervention and standing jurisprudence are relatively clear in 
rebuffing party status for initiative proponents and individual legislators, as just 
discussed, something more than a doctrinal misunderstanding must be enabling 
these actors to become defendants in federal litigation.  The remainder of the 
Essay explores why some federal courts have been overly generous in allowing 
intervention and finding standing for these would-be defenders.  By looking at 
intervention and standing decisions across contexts, including in Perry and in the 
DOMA litigation, we can see this deviation from procedural rules in relief.  It is, I 
argue, part of a larger phenomenon at the crossroads of procedure and judicial 
legitimacy, where judicial legitimacy concerns appear to permeate procedural 
decisionmaking and override otherwise operative procedural constraints.   
 
It is not surprising that litigation involving voter-initiated and otherwise 
popular measures present a high-vulnerability context for courts that are sensitive 
to their countermajoritarian position.
8
  But it is striking how far procedural 
decisionmaking in these cases may wind up deviating from what the governing 
rules and doctrine would seem to require, even when courts are willing to strike 
down these measures on the merits.  
 
 In these contexts, procedural deviation functions as a kind of release valve 
that federal courts use, probably inadvertently, to signal engagement with and 
accountability to the public.  Especially in decisions regarding intervention by 
initiative proponents, two related legitimacy concerns come to the fore.  One I 
characterize as countermajoritarian guilt.  This concern draws from Lockean 
notions of fairness and procedural due process rhetoric and reflects the impulse 
that it is unfair to block initiative promoters from defending their measures after 
they put in the work to obtain passage.  The other I describe as countermajoritarian 
anxiety to capture courts’ concern that the adjudication process will be both tainted 
and ineffectual if the promoters of a challenged measure are denied full party 
status. 
 
                                                          
7
  See Lujan at 573-74 (stating that an abstract interest in the government’s “proper application of 
the Constitution and laws” is insufficient, of itself, for Article III standing).  In U.S. v. Robinson, 
418 U.S. 166 (1974), the Court rejected standing for an individual who sought a report on Central 
Intelligence Agency expenditures under the Constitution’s Accounts Clause.  Although the plaintiff 
argued that not having this information would limit his ability to vote, the Court held, per Chief 
Justice Burger, that “[t]his is surely a generalized grievance since the impact on him is plainly 
undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.”  Id. at xx 
8
  See infra at xx. 
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My ultimate claim here is that although these concerns warrant serious 
attention, loosening intervention law is a costly and ultimately flawed way to 
address them.  Allowing initiative promoters and groups of lawmakers to intervene 
as full parties, and then to appeal without a concomitant appeal by a government 
defendant, defies the intervention rules’ text and weakens Article III’s constraints.  
Even worse, this trend  blurs the lines of what entities federal courts will count as 
governments and what interests courts will treat as governmentally-sanctioned.  
These concerns do not suggest that proponents should be absent from litigation 
involving their measures, however.  Instead, amicus status – including “litigating 
amicus” status, as needed – is far more appropriate, doctrinally and otherwise, to 
insure that the federal courts operate with both constitutional integrity and public 
legitimacy.   
 
II. An Opening Question:  Intervention’s Scope and Limits 
 
When plaintiffs challenge a law’s constitutionality, even in the case of a 
voter-initiated law, they nearly always sue government officials.  The reason is 
straightforward:  the remedy they need, most often, is a court order blocking those 
officials from enforcing the challenged law.
9
  By contrast, participation is not so 
automatic for initiative proponents; instead, typically, proponents must move to 
intervene.  This section looks to intervention law’s gatekeeping function, then, as 
the threshold inquiry to be addressed even before the question of standing for non-
state actors.     
 
As any first year law student knows, intervention in federal court comes in 
two types – intervention of right, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), and 
permissive intervention under F.R.C.P. 24(b).
10
  In essence, intervention of right is 
                                                          
9
  In these cases, the designated defendant is sometimes the governor, and at others, it is the 
attorney general or the head of the relevant state agency, but in all instances, the defendant is an 
official representative of the state. The reason that plaintiffs sue an official rather than the state 
itself flows in part from the statute that authorizes federal suits for state-based violations of 
constitutional rights, which creates a cause of action against persons who deprive others of 
constitutional rights.  42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.  More significantly, sovereign immunity doctrine bars 
the state from being sued directly.  See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157–58, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 
L.Ed. 714 (1908)   Still, as the Ninth Circuit explained in Perry v. Brown, at 1071, “ in a suit for an 
injunction against enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state law, it makes no practical 
difference whether the formal party before the court is the state itself or a state officer in his official 
capacity.” 
Of course, there are instances where constitutional challenges to state laws might arise in 
suits against local government units or private parties.  Typically in these cases, a procedural rule 
requires that the state attorney general receive notice of the challenge and, often, an opportunity to 
participate in the law’s defense.  [cites] 
10
  Rule 24 provides in full: 
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allowed when non-parties have a sufficient interest in the action’s subject matter 
and will not be able to protect that interest if they are not named a party to the 
suit.
11
  If an existing party adequately represents the would-be intervenor’s 
interest, however, intervention is denied.
12
  Permissive intervention under F.R.C.P. 
R.24(b) requires less; the proposed intervenor need only have “a claim or defense 
that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.”13  The federal 
rules also instruct courts to consider whether the new permissive intervenor “will 
unduly delay or prejudice” the parties in the existing litigation.14   
 
Underlying this straightforward text we find, not surprisingly, a host of 
questions.   For would-be intervenors of right, we need to know, for example, how 
                                                                                                                                                                
(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who: (1) is 
given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (2) claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless 
existing parties adequately represent that interest.  
(b) Permissive Intervention. (1) In General. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to 
intervene who: (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (B) has a claim 
or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.  (2) By a Government 
Officer or Agency. On timely motion, the court may permit a federal or state governmental officer 
or agency to intervene if a party's claim or defense is based on: (A) a statute or executive order 
administered by the officer or agency; or (B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement 
issued or made under the statute or executive order. (3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its 
discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication of the original parties’ rights. 
(c) Notice and Pleading Required. A motion to intervene must be served on the parties as provided 
in Rule 5. The motion must state the grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a pleading 
that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought. 
Considerations of timeliness are also paramount for courts in adjudicating intervention 
motions. [cites to come]  Because those considerations are typically not present in the types of 
cases I focus on here, I do not address them in depth.  The district court’s timeliness assessment is 
ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion; the circuits vary in how closely they review district 
court decisions regarding the other FRCP 24(a) factors. [cites]  The rule also allows intervention by 
those with statutory authorization but no statutes authorize intervention for the initiative proponents 
and subsets of lawmakers I focus on here so, again, I do not discuss the portions of the intervention 
rule that address that issue. 
More generally, it is well settled that the rule is to be construed liberally. [cites to come] 
At the same time, however, despite its label, intervention of right is not absolute; courts retain 
discretion to deny intervention, particularly where movants will not contribute distinctly to the 
litigation.  In granting parents’ motion to intervene in a school desegregation suit, Judge Bazelon 
observed that the "decision whether intervention of right is warranted thus involves an 
accommodation between two potentially conflicting goals: to achieve judicial economies of scale 
by resolving related issues in a single lawsuit, and to prevent the single lawsuit from becoming 
fruitlessly complex or unending." Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969).   
12
  See infra at xx. 
13
  F.R.C.P. R.24(b). 
14
  Id. 
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much of an interest the proposed intervenor must have in the lawsuit’s subject 
matter.  Likewise, we need to know the conditions under which the intervenor’s 
ability to protect that interest will be impaired, and how much similarity must exist 
between the proposed intervenor and an existing party to find that the intervenor is 
already adequately represented in the litigation.    For would-be permissive 
intervenors, a central question concerns how much in common the outsider non-
party must have with the main action to become a full party to the litigation.  
Likewise, we must know how much delay or prejudice to existing parties is too 
much.  The discussion that follows takes up these inquiries.  
 
Intervention of Right 
 
Although there is consensus that intervention of right is a relatively limited 
procedural option, courts diverge in assessing how much interest the proposed 
intervenor must have “in the property or transaction that is the subject matter of 
the action.
15
  The basic rule is clear that the interest’s sufficiency must be 
                                                          
15
 For discussion of the circuit split regarding the need for intervenors to establish independent 
Article III standing, see infra at xx.  Also oft-debated regarding intervention of right is the 
“adequate representation” inquiry, which can lead a court to deny intervention even if the movant 
has a sufficient interest in the litigation.  See, e.g., Prete v. Bradbury, 483 F.3d 949, 955-56, 957-59 
(9
th
 Cir. 2006) (rejecting intervention where sponsors of an Oregon ballot measure had a 
protectable interest but were adequately represented by the government defendant).  On the one 
hand, when the government is a party, it is frequently treated as providing adequate representation 
if the intervention applicant and government party seek the same ultimate objective.  See, e.g., 
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297 (9
th
 Cir. 1997) (sustaining 
denial of intervention where the court found that the group that had drafted and sponsored initiative 
was adequately represented by the state defendant); Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 186 n.7 
(7th Cir. 1982).  On the other, it is “not uncommon” for courts to depart from the assumption that 
government representation is adequate in cases where “government regulations are challenged and 
private parties who benefit from such regulations seek to intervene as defendants.”  United States v. 
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 101 F.R.D. 451, 457 (W.D.N.Y.) , aff'd, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 
1984).  The leading case in the area is  Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528, 
538 n. 10, 92 S.Ct. 630, 636 n. 10, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972)), which held that “The requirement of 
[Rule 24(a)(2) ] is satisfied if the applicant shows that the representation of his interest ‘may be’ 
inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as minimal.” Id. at 538 n. 10, 
92 S.Ct. 630.  See also Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago, 170 F.R.D. 435 (N.D. 
Ill. 1996) (holding that “applicants do not need to show, to a certainty, that the City will not fully 
protect their interests; rather, they need only show that the City might fail to do so”).   
In the kinds of cases at issue here, where a non-state actor seeks intervention to defend a 
measure passed by voter initiative, the adequate-representation inquiry should not to pose much of 
a barrier because initiative promoters arguably bring a different quality of enthusiasm and expertise 
to the litigation.  The inadequacy of government representation is even clearer, of course, where the 
government defendant opposes the challenged measure.   
In addition to the divergence among circuits discussed in the text, circuits have also split 
over whether an intervenor as of right must have standing independent of the original parties to the 
suit.  Compare San Juan County v. United States, 420 F.3d 1197, 1204-05 (10th Cir.2005) (holding 
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determined functionally rather than formally.
16
  But what this flexible approach 
means for the required interest’s breadth is not entirely clear, and circuits have 
split over how best to make that determination.   The Supreme Court’s most recent 
extended engagement with FRCP 24(a) “recognized that certain public concerns 
may constitute an adequate ‘interest’” and that a “’significantly protectable 
interest’” is what is required.17  Commentators and lower courts, however, have 
suggested that the Court’s rulings do not provide much help.18  As Judge Bazelon 
observed some years earlier, “The effort to extract substance from the conclusory 
phrase ‘interest’ or ‘legally protectable interest’ is of limited promise.”19  As a 
result, “the circuit courts of appeals have struggled to reach a definitive 
interpretation” of the rule,20 and “[c]ourts have adopted a variety of approaches 
and a wide range of terminology in discussing the issue of interest.”21 
                                                                                                                                                                
that Article III standing is not necessary for intervention); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830 (5th 
Cir. 1998); Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir.1994) (same); 
Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.1991) (same); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 
1213 (11th Cir.1989) (same); and United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d 
Cir.1978) (same); with Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that Article 
III standing is required for intervention), and United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 
859 (7th Cir.1985)  See Jones v. Prince George's County, 348 F.3d 1014, 1017 (D.C.Cir.2003); 
South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1023 (8th Cir.2003) (same); Solid Waste Agency v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 101 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir.1996) (same).   
16
  The original rule required intervenors to be legally bound by the original litigation’s result, 
while the post-1966 version, still in place today asks whether the existing litigation would impair 
the outsider’s interest “as a practical matter.”  New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe 
Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).  This increased flexibility was aimed 
deliberately to “expand the circumstances in which intervention of right would be appropriate.” San 
Juan Cty v. US, 503 F.3d 1163 (10
th
 Cir. 2007) (en banc) (discussing rule revisions). 
17
  Diamond v. Charles, (discussing Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 
U.S. 129, 135 (1967) and Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971)).  Concurring in 
Diamond v. Charles, Justice O’Connor added that “[c]learly, Donaldson's requirement of a 
“significantly protectable interest” calls for a direct and concrete interest that is accorded some 
degree of legal protection.” (citations omitted)  Diamond at 75. See also Advisory Committee's 
Notes on Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 24, 28 U.S.C.App., p. 567.  
18
  See, e.g., 7C Wright et al., supra, § 1908, at 263 (There is not as yet any clear definition, either 
from the Supreme Court or from the lower courts, of the nature of the “interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action” that is required for intervention of right.)  
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)); San Juan Cty, at xx (“The Supreme Court has directly addressed the 
impaired-interest requirement on only two occasions [Cascade Natural Gas Corp. and Donaldson]. 
Neither opinion is much help. One contains merely a bare holding, with essentially no explanation. 
The other explains its holding but it is unclear how much it relies on Rule 24.”). 
19
   Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C.Cir.1969) (Bazelon, C.J., plurality opinion). 
20
  7C Wright et al., supra, § 1908, at 270 .  Circuit courts vary, too, in the standard of review they 
apply to district court rulings on intervention motions.  On motions to intervene as of right, 
appellate review ranges from abuse of discretion in the First Circuit, see, e.g., International Paper 
Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Jay, Me., 887 F.2d 338, 343-44 (1
st
 Cir. 1989) to de novo in the Fifth 
Circuit, see, e.g., City of Houston v. American Traffic Solutions, Inc., 668 F.3d 291, 293 (5
th
 Cir. 
9 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
2012) (citation omitted).  See also Fund for Animals v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 733 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (comparing Smoke, 252 F.3d at 470-71 (stating that the court reviews denials of 
intervention as of right for clear error), and Foster, 655 F.2d at 1324 (same), with Mova 
Pharm., 140 F.3d at 1074 (explaining that “[t]o the extent that a district court's ruling on a motion 
to intervene as of right is based on questions of law, it is reviewed de novo; to the extent that it is 
based on questions of fact, it is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion”), and Building & 
Constr. Trades, 40 F.3d at 1282 (stating that denials are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard).  For permissive intervention, by contrast, the standard is settled at abuse of discretion.  
See Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 142 (1944) (denial of Rule 
24(b) permissive intervention is within the district court’s discretion and is reviewable only where 
clear abuse of discretion has been shown). 
21
  6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 24.03 [2][a], at 24-30 (3d ed. 2006).  For 
example, the Second Circuit  barred a utility company form intervening in a citizen’s suit seeking 
Environmental Protection Agency review of air quality standards because the company’s interest 
was “too remote and therefore insufficient”).  See also American Lung Ass'n v. Reilly, 962 F.2d 
258, 261 (2d Cir. 1992) (interest of utility companies in citizens' suit seeking review by EPA of air 
quality standards was too remote and, therefore, insufficient).  Similarly, Trans Chem. Ltd. v. 
China Nat'l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 332 F.3d 815, 823-824 (5th Cir. 2003) (applicants for 
intervention did not have "direct and substantial" interest in suit to enforce arbitration award when 
they sought intervention to litigate whether they were owners of plaintiff corporation).  For 
additional discussion of interests sufficient to justify intervention of right, see, e.g.,  
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina ( In re Sierra Club), 945 F.2d 776, 779 (4th 
Cir.1991) (holding that an environmental organization that was party to an administrative 
permitting proceeding was entitled to intervene of right in an action challenging the 
constitutionality of a state regulation); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., 713 F.2d at 527-28 (holding that 
wildlife organizations were entitled to intervene of right in an action procedurally challenging the 
Department of the Interior’s decision to establish a conservation area); Washington State Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council, 684 F.2d at 630 (holding that “the public interest group that sponsored the 
[statute as a ballot] initiative ... was entitled to intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)” in 
an action challenging the constitutionality of the statute); Yniguez, 939 F.2d at 735 (same); Planned 
Parenthood v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 869 (8th Cir.1977) (holding that a 
neighborhood association, whose “professed purpose ... is to preserve property values and insure 
that abortion facilities do not affect the health, welfare and safety of citizens,” was entitled to 
intervene in an action challenging the constitutionality of a local ordinance imposing a moratorium 
on the construction of abortion clinics); New York Public Interest Research Group v. Regents of the 
Univ., 516 F.2d 350, 351-52 (2d Cir.1975) (holding that a pharmacists' organization and individual 
pharmacists had a right to intervene in an action brought by consumers to challenge a state 
regulation prohibiting the advertising of the price of prescription drugs); Coalition of Arizona/New 
Mexico Counties for Stable Economic Growth v. Department of Interior, 100 F.3d 837 (10
th
 Cir. 
1996) (holding that a prospective intervenor's interest in Mexican spotted owl, as photographer, 
amateur biologist, and naturalist who had been at forefront of efforts to protect owl under 
Endangered Species Act (ESA), was direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest, for 
purposes of intervention as of right in county coalition's action challenging Fish and Wildlife 
Service's (FWS) decision to protect owl under Act. ) 
 Cases denying intervention of right also offer insight into the scope of the “interest” 
requirement.  See, e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1269-70 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that lobby 
organization in Illinois legislature did not have protectable interest in lawsuit regarding 
constitutionality of law regulating abortion because the only entities with sufficient interest were 
governmental bodies required to defend and enforce law of state); United States v. 36.96 Acres of 
10 
 
For intervenors seeking to defend a ballot measure and lawmakers seeking 
to defend legislation that they support, an additional challenge lies in showing that 
the interest, however defined, is at risk of impairment by the ongoing litigation.  
Because ballot measures do not typically create property or other cognizable rights 
for their proponents, and because legislation does not typically create rights 
particular to legislators, it is not clear how proponents or legislators in those 
contexts can claim any sort of cognizable interest, much less a “significant 
protectable interest.”  After all, to take the case of Proposition 8, it is difficult to 
see how the measure, which restricts the marriage rights of same-sex couples, 
could impair, practically or otherwise, a protectable interest of its official 
proponents where none of the individuals identifies as gay or as seeking to marry a 
same-sex partner, and the sponsoring not-for-profit organization does not claim to 
include individuals seeking to marry a same-sex partner in its membership.
22
  The 
same is true for BLAG and its effort to defend DOMA. 
 
Still, numerous courts have found that initiative proponents do have the 
requisite interest for intervention as right.  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit concluded, in 
a case involving an English-only initiative, that “[t] here appears to be a virtual per 
se rule that the sponsors of a ballot initiative have a sufficient interest in the 
subject matter of the litigation to intervene pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a).”23  On 
its view, because “Rule 24 traditionally has received a liberal construction . . . the 
public interest group that sponsored the initiative [is] entitled to intervention as a 
matter of right under Rule 24(a).”24 
 
But the special ballot-sponsor intervention rule has never been as 
categorical as the Ninth Circuit suggests.  In particular, the Sixth Circuit warned 
                                                                                                                                                                
Land, 754 F.2d 855, 858-60 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that lobby organization attempting to foster 
national legislation did not have right to intervene; only government had a protectable interest in 
condemnation action between sovereign and private party); Resort Timeshare Resales, Inc. v. 
Stuart, 764 F.Supp. 1495, 1499 (S.D.Fla.1991) (holding that lobbyist was not entitled to intervene 
when asserted interest in law was too nebulous to create “real party in interest” in litigation 
challenging constitutionality of state statute requiring timeshare sellers to obtain real estate 
licenses). 
22
  The initiative proponents whose cert petition was granted in Perry v. Brown include Dennis 
Hollingsworth, Gail J. Knight, Martin F. Gutierrez, Mark A. Jansson, and ProtectMarriage.com – 
Yes on 8, a Project of California Renewal.   [cite and discussion of the proponent who removed 
himself from the case to come] 
23
  Yniguez v Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 735 (9
th
 Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). 
24
  Id. See also See Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1251-1253 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(environmental groups had sufficient interest in national monument to intervene in suit seeking to 
have creation of monument declared illegal); Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable 
Economic Growth v. Dep't of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 840-844 (10th Cir. 1996) (wildlife 
photographer had sufficient interest to intervene in suit to protect Mexican Spotted Owl).    
11 
 
that “[w]ithout [] limitations of the legal interest required for intervention, Rule 24 
would be abused as a mechanism for the over-politicization of the judicial 
process.”25  It reasoned that while public interest organizations, including ballot 
measure sponsors, have a sufficient interest in the initiative process, only those 
“regulated by the new law, or, similarly, whose members are affected by the law, 
may likely have an ongoing legal interest in its enforcement after it is enacted.”26  
Any others can have “only a generic interest shared by the entire . . . citizenry,” 
and an “interest so generalized will not support a claim for intervention as of 
right).
27
 
 
Consistent with this view, far fewer courts have accepted intervention by 
subgroups of lawmakers, as will be discussed at greater length infra.  Yet for 
BLAG, as also discussed below, intervention has come easily.
28
 
 
The latter part of this Essay will theorize about the reasons for this 
divergence between Rule 24(a) jurisprudence and its application in Perry and the 
DOMA cases; for purposes here, the point is simply that, notwithstanding the raft 
of judicial decisions allowing intervention of right to Proposition 8’s proponents 
and BLAG, it is not obvious that either can claim the interest required of those 
who seek to intervene as of right. 
 
Permissive Intervention 
 
Perhaps permissive intervention is a better fit for ballot measure sponsors?  
Recall that permissive intervention’s chief requirements are that the moving party 
have a claim or defense involving a question of fact or law that is common to the 
original action and that the intervention not unduly delay or prejudice the existing 
litigants.  As the Supreme Court has explained, F.R.C.P. 24(b) "plainly dispenses 
with any requirement that the intervenor shall have a direct personal or pecuniary 
                                                          
25
 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm (at 783- but quoting something else).  
Similar, the Seventh Circuit observed that there is no special public interest rule. [check – not sure 
this is actually in the op] BUT - No special public interest rule. Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 
1268-1269 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Moore's, intervention of right denied to pro-life public interest 
group seeking to challenge abortion legislation). 
26
  In Granholm (quoting .” Id. at 345; accord, e.g., Grutter, 188 F.3d at 401 (holding that proposed 
intervenors, who were applicants to the University of Michigan, had a substantial legal interest in 
the school's admissions process); Miller, 103 F.3d at 1247 (holding that the Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce had a substantial legal interest where it was regulated by at least three of the four 
statutory provisions challenged by plaintiffs). 
27
  Granholm, citing/quoting: .” Miller, 103 F.3d at 1246 (quoting and citing with approval Athens 
Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir.1982) 
28
  See infra. 
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interest in the subject of the litigation.”29  Moreover, courts have made clear that 
permissive intervention can be granted where an applicant presents the same legal 
claim or defense as an existing party, even when its claims arise from different 
factual circumstances.”30 
 
Because permissive intervention encompasses so many would-be litigants 
who have only a minimal connection to the ongoing lawsuit, district courts have 
significant discretion
31
 to gauge the costs and benefits associated with allowing 
them in.
32
  With some frequency, district courts allow permissive intervention by 
public interest organizations with long-standing interest and expertise in the issues 
before the court.
33
  But again, questions about the value and burdens associated 
                                                          
29
  SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 459, 60 S. Ct. 1044, 1055, 84 
L.Ed. 1293, 1306 (1940).  See also  Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1108-1111 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (district court did not abuse its discretion in granting permissive intervention to 
environmental group seeking to support of U.S. Forest Service rule, even though applicants had no 
"significant protectable interest" in subject matter of suit). 
30
  See, e.g., McNeill v. New York City Hous. Auth., 719 F. Supp. 233, 250-251 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(granting low-income tenants' motion to intervene permissively because applicants presented 
identical legal claims to those of tenant plaintiffs despite fact that circumstances of intervenors' 
claims were different from those of original plaintiffs ). 
31
 See, e.g., South Dakota ex rel. Barnett v. United States Dep't of Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 787-788 
(8th Cir. 2003) ("Reversal of a decision denying permissive intervention is extremely rare, 
bordering on nonexistent"); Rosenshein v. Kleban, 918 F. Supp. 98, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(observing that the district court possesses "broad discretion in resolving applications for 
permissive intervention"); Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 6, 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(district court's discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) is broad).  On appellate review of 
intervention motions generally, see supra note xx. 
32
  See, e.g., Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.1977) 
(considering additional factors in exercising discretion, including “the nature and extent of the 
intervenors' interest” and “whether the intervenors' interests are adequately represented by other 
parties”). 
33
  See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 340 F. Supp. 400, 
408-409 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) , rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972) (granting 
permissive intervention to Audubon Society in environmental dispute involving strip-mining and 
asserts that "Audubon demonstrates a long-standing interest in and familiarity with strip-mining, 
expertise that may be helpful in clarifying the facts and issues"); General Motors Corp. v. Burns, 
50 F.R.D. 401, 405 (D. Haw. 1970) (allowing Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) intervention and noting 
Hawaii's statement that intervenor "and its members have unique knowledge of the Hawaii 
automobile industry and ... similar statutes in other jurisdictions" that will help "to fully present to 
the Court all of the facts in this case"); Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529, 1538-1539 (N.D. 
Fla. 1995) (granting permissive intervention to the NAACP in a redistricting dispute, reasoning that 
the NAACP’s participation would aid the court in its constitutional inquiry and would bring a 
"unique perspective," and noting that the organization had been allowed to intervene in similar 
actions around the country).  Cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185, 
189 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting county’s permissive intervention motion in a Voting Rights Act case 
because its input would not significantly help develop relevant factual issues). 
13 
 
with the intervention loom large.
34
  Consequently, when courts believe that a 
potential intervenor will essentially repeat the same sort of evidence that existing 
parties will present, they typically characterize intervention as counterproductive 
and as something that will unnecessarily prolong the litigation.
35
  But again, even 
absent redundancy, the rule’s plain text requires that the intervening party have a 
claim or a defense; nothing in the rule indicates that the intervenor can appear to 
assert interests it does not possess.    
 
Although adequacy of representation is not formally part of the permissive 
intervention rule as it is for intervention as of right, courts often consider it as part 
of this calculus when deciding whether to grant a permissive intervention 
request.
36
  Likewise, if one of the existing parties is the government and that party 
                                                          
34
  Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 343-346 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that denial of permissive intervention should not be reversed without clear abuse of discretion, and 
such abuse was not shown when district court had addressed relevant criteria, including delay and 
prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)); 1st Circuit Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics 
& Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating, in case challenging campaign 
financing legislation, that relevant factor justifying rejection of intervenors was the need to 
expedite resolution of case).  Cf. H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Med. Sys., 797 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 
1986) (finding no abuse of discretion where state was not allowed to intervene in a private antitrust 
action because, in addition to the potential for undue delay, the state failed to demonstrate that its 
intervention would assist in the "just and equitable adjudication of any of the issues between the 
parties"). 
35
  See South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S.Ct. 854, 875 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring and 
dissenting in part) (“’Where he presents no new questions, a third party can contribute usually most 
effectively and always most expeditiously by a brief amicus curiae and not by 
intervention.’”)(citation omitted).  See also Getty Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 865 F.2d 270, 
277 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that when non-party presented no new questions, 
intervention should be denied and amicus curiae brief would be more efficient); Arney v. Finney, 
967 F.2d 418, 421-422 (10th Cir. 1992) (sustaining denial of intervention because applicant's 
intervention would not aid class of prison inmates in its attempt to correct allegedly 
unconstitutional conditions); NBD Bank, N.A. v. Bennett, 159 F.R.D. 505, 508 (S.D. Ind. 1994) 
(denying intervention to an association of insurance agents that sought to intervene and defend suit 
by banks against state insurance commissioner and reasoning that intervenor raised no new 
defenses). 
36
 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 834 
F.2d 60, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that the fact that intervenor's claimed interest was 
economic and existing defendants' interest was governmental did not establish inadequate 
representation in citizens' suit under Clean Air Act).  Cf. Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy, 
Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 101 F.R.D. 497, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing adequacy of 
representation of intervenors' interest by existing parties is "minor factor at most" in determining 
motions for intervention) (citation omitted); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Pipe Line Co., 
732 F.2d 452, 472 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that whether intervenors' interests are adequately 
represented by other parties is proper factor to consider in acting on request for permissive 
intervention); South Dakota ex rel. Barnett v. United States Dep't of Interior, 317 F.3d 783, 787-
788 (8th Cir. 2003) (observing that whether existing parties will adequately protect proposed 
intervenor's interests is a minor variable, but it is legitimate consideration, and that district court did 
14 
 
is aggressively seeking the same outcome as the proposed intervenor, courts are 
often unwilling to grant permissive intervention.
37
 
 
Intervention Rules as Applied:  Perry v. Brown 
 
Perry is a particularly interesting case for exploring the application of this 
intervention jurisprudence in part because the district court granted only two 
intervention motions from a much broader array.  Most significantly for purposes 
here, the district court found that Proposition 8’s sponsors could intervene as of 
right under FRCP 24(a), concluding, without explanation, that they had a 
“significant protectible interest in defending Proposition 8’s constitutionality” and 
that that interest would be affected directly by the lawsuit.
38
  The court found as 
well that their interest “was not represented by another party” because the 
Attorney General, who was charged with enforcing the measure, had indicated his 
view that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.
39
  The district court also granted the 
City of San Francisco’s motion to intervene permissively because the City had 
claimed its financial interest would be adversely affected by Proposition 8. The 
court made clear that this factor, rather than the City’s ability to contribute 
generally to the factual record, led it to permit intervention.  Based on that 
analysis, the court limited the City’s participation in the case to issues related to its 
financial interest.
40
  Proposition 8’s promoters faced no similar limitation.   
                                                                                                                                                                
not abuse its discretion when it denied intervention primarily because it found that proposed 
intervenor's interests were adequately protected by U.S. Government); Arney v. Finney, 967 F.2d 
418, 421 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the fact that applicant's interests were adequately 
represented by class representatives meant applicant had no right to intervene, and was also 
relevant factor in denial of permissive intervention); Arney v. Finney, 967 F.2d 418, 421-422 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (upholding denial of applicant's motion to intervene as class representative in action 
challenging prison conditions because other class representatives adequately represented interests 
of class, including applicant)). 
37
 See, e.g., Menominee Indian Tribe v. Thompson, 164 F.R.D. 672, 678 (W.D. Wis. 1996) 
(denying permissive intervention request of paper trade association and paper manufacturers and 
asserting that "[w]hen intervention of right is denied for the proposed intervenor's failure to 
overcome the presumption of adequate representation by the government, the case for permissive 
intervention disappears"). 
38
  Order at 3, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 76).  Because it 
granted the proponents’ Rule 24(a) motion, the court did not address the motion for permissive 
intervention. 
39
  Id. 
40
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(No. 162) (“[I]t seems to the Court that what distinguishes San Francisco as an intervenor, 
especially from the others seeking intervention, that is San Francisco claims a governmental 
interest that no other party, including the Governor and the Attorney General of California, has 
15 
 
At the same time, the court rejected intervention motions by organizations 
representing same-sex couples and by an organization opposed to marriage rights 
for same-sex couples.  Regarding intervention of right, it found that the 
organizations representing couples had advanced a sufficient interest but were 
adequately represented by the existing plaintiffs, and that the proposed defendant-
intervenor did not have the requisite interest and, even if it did,  it was already 
adequately represented.
41
  With respect to permissive intervention, the court held 
that “the participation of these additional parties would add very little, if anything, 
to the actual record, but in all probability would consume additional time and 
resources of both the Court and the parties that have a direct stake in the outcome 
of these proceedings.”42  The Ninth Circuit affirmed both rulings, consistent with 
its Circuit’s settled recognition of initiative-sponsors as parties.43  
 
In short, intervention rules operated to filter out many would-be intervenors 
from the litigation, including those with cognizable injuries as a result of 
Proposition 8.  But they did not serve a gatekeeping role with respect to 
Proposition 8’s official sponsors and instead endowed those sponsors with full 
status as defendants.   
 
Intervention Rules as Applied II – BLAG and the DOMA cases 
 
The ease with which BLAG intervened in to defend DOMA in multiple 
federal courts is notable as well.  BLAG, a 5-person body comprised of House 
                                                                                                                                                                
asserted. Because of this interest, it appears that San Francisco has an independent interest in the 
proceedings, and the ability to contribute to the development of the underlying issues without 
materially delaying the proceedings.”).  
41
  Id. at xx.   
42
  Id. at 53.  
43
  The organization opposing marriage rights for same-sex couples, The Campaign for California 
Families, appealed the denial of its interventions motions to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the 
district court’s ruling.  Regarding the motion to intervene as of right, the court wrote: 
 The reality is that the Campaign and those advocating the constitutionality of Prop. 8 
have identical interests-that is, to uphold Prop. 8. Any differences are rooted in style and 
degree, not the ultimate bottom line. Divergence of tactics and litigation strategy is not 
tantamount to divergence over the ultimate objective of the suit. Because the existing 
parties will adequately represent the Campaign's interests, we affirm the district court's 
denial of intervention as of right. 
Perry v. Brown, 587 F.3d 947, 949 (9
th
 Cir. 2009).  Regarding permissive intervention, the court 
added that ”[i]t was well within the district court's discretion to find that the delay occasioned by 
intervention outweighed the value added by the Campaign's participation in the suit.”  Id. at 956. 
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majority and minority leaders,
44
 filed intervention motions in numerous DOMA 
actions after the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it would no longer 
defend the statute.
45
  Most of these motions were unopposed;
46
 all have been 
granted.
47
   
                                                          
44
  Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives, Section 670, Rule II.8 (“The Office of 
General Counsel shall function pursuant to the direction of the Speaker, who shall consult with a 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, which shall include the majority and minority leaderships.”). 
45
  See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to Representative John A. 
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 5 (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html (announcing and explaining DOJ’s 
decision not to defend DOMA).  The Attorney General is required to notify the House leadership 
pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) of its decision “to refrain (on the grounds that the 
provision is unconstitutional) from defending . . . the constitutionality of any provision of any 
Federal statute.”   
The House Speaker responded by convening BLAG and indicating that BLAG would 
intervene to defend DOMA.  See Press Release, Representative John Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. 
House of Representatives, House Will Ensure DOMA Constitutionality Is Determined by the Court 
(Mar. 9, 2011), available at http:// 
johnboehner.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=228585.   
BLAG’s two minority members opposed the decision to intervene.  See Representative 
Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Letter to Speaker Boehner on House Counsel Defense of DOMA (Mar. 11, 
2011), available at http:// pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/2011/03/pelosi-letter-to-speaker-
boehner-on-house-counsel-defense-of-doma.shtml. 
46
  Plaintiffs in suits challenging DOMA did not generally oppose BLAG’s motions to intervene.  
See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Mgt., 824 F.Supp.2d 968, 977 (N.D. 2012); Windsor 
v. United States, 797 F. Supp.2d 320, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Neither the plaintiff nor the DOJ 
opposes BLAG’s intervention”).  But see Revelis v. Napolitano, 844 F.Supp.2d 915, 924 (N.D.Ill. 
2012) (“Plaintiff opposes BLAG’s motion to intervene, arguing that it should be limited to amicus 
curiae status.”).  In several cases, the DOJ sought to limit BLAG’s involvement to making 
substantive arguments in DOMA’s defense.  The court in Windsor rejected that argument, see 
Windsor at 323-25, but the district court in Revelis appeared to accept it.  Revelis at 924, 925 
(acknowledging DOJ’s request that BLAG be “limited to making substantive arguments in support 
of DOMA, while they continue to file all procedural notices” and holding that “BLAG may 
intervene for the purpose of defending the constitutionality of DOMA”).     
47
  See Blesch v. Holder, 2012 Westlaw 1965401 *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2012) (“Each of the 10 
federal courts to consider the issue has permitted the House to intervene. See Torres–Barragan v. 
Holder, No. 10–55768 (9th Cir. April 10, 2012) (ECF No. 56); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of 
HHS, Nos. 10–2204, 10–2207, 10–2214 (1st Cir. June 16, 2011) (ECF No. 5558549); Revelis v. 
Napolitano, No. 11–cv01991 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 5, 2012) (ECF No. 33); Cozen O'Connor, P.C. v. 
Tobits, No. 11–cv–00045 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 16, 2011) (ECF No. 82); Bishop v. United States, No. 04–
cv–00848 (N.D.Okla. Aug. 5, 2011) (ECF No. 181); Lui v. Holder, 11–cv–01267 (C.D.Cal. July 
13, 2011) (ECF No. 25); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 10–cv–1564 (N.D. Cal. June 
10, 2011) (ECF No. 88); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10–cv–0257 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 
2011) (ECF No. 116); Windsor v. United States, 10–cv–08435, 797 F.Supp.2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. June 
2, 2011); Pederson v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 10–cv–01750 (D.Conn. May 27, 2011) (ECF No. 
55).”).  For web-accessible versions of some of these opinions, see Dragovich v. U.S. Dep't of the 
17 
 
Only two opinions gave the intervention motion extended consideration 
and both found that BLAG had the requisite interest level for intervention of right.  
In Windsor, the magistrate concluded that “BLAG has a cognizable interest in 
defending the enforceability of statutes the House has passed when the President 
declines to enforce them.”48  And in Revelis, the court found that BLAG’s interests 
exceeded those of an “ordinary taxpayer” because “[t]he House has an interest in 
defending the constitutionality of legislation which it passed when the executive 
branch declines to do so.”49 
The essay’s next part shows through Article III case law, why individual 
representatives and subgroups of legislators, such as BLAG, do not actually have 
more of a particularized interest than voters or taxpayers in enforcing the statutes 
they participating in passing.
50
  Here, it simply bears noting that although some 
courts have treated BLAG as though it were the House of Representatives,
51
 it is 
                                                                                                                                                                
Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Windsor v. United States, No. 10-civ-8435 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 9, 2010); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 
2010).] 
48
  Windsor, 797 F.Supp.2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
49
  Revelis, 844 F.Supp.2d at 924-25. 
50
  Although BLAG’s submissions supporting intervention have cited to cases involving 
intervention by the House, Daniel Meltzer observed that “some of these cases . . . involved 
executive-legislative disagreements about the separation of powers, and in none of them did the 
congressional intervenor appear actually to have engaged in full-scale litigation in the district court, 
as distinguished from having defended the statute in connection with a motion for a preliminary 
injunction, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or a motion for summary judgment on a 
very limited record, such as affidavits.”  Daniel Meltzer, 61 Duke L. Rev. 1183, 1210 n.133 (2012).   
 
51
  In Revelis, the court deemed “unpersuasive” the plaintiff’s contention “that BLAG does not 
represent Congress as a whole.”  Revelis, 844 F.Supp.2d at 925.  It wrote “BLAG, a five-member 
bipartisan group, is the mechanism through which the House presents its position in litigation, and 
courts have allowed it to intervene in cases where appropriate.”  Id.  The court cited two cases in 
support.  One, In re Matter of Koerner, 800 F.2d 1358, 1360 (5
th
 Cir. 1986), contained no analysis 
of the intervention motion.  The other, Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 23, n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 
vacated on other grounds sub nom. by Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987), does not appear to 
strengthen BLAG’s position for two reasons.  First, that case involved legislators’ objection to the 
President’s handling of a bill that, they argued, had nullified their votes.  Recognizing an interest 
like this would conceivably be consistent with extant doctrine finding that legislators have a 
cognizable interest in the legislative process being a fair one.  See infra at n. xx   But interest in fair 
process does not translate to a cognizable interest for individuals or subgroups of legislators in 
enforcing legislation once it has passed.  And second, although the Supreme Court did not address 
the question of intervenors’ interests because it vacated the decision below on mootness grounds, 
Justice Stevens’ dissent on the mootness point, underscored that the Court had not found the 
representatives to have sufficient interest in pursuing the action on their own behalf.  See id. at 366 
(“There is, of course, a serious question whether the Senate of the United States and a group of 33 
Congressmen have standing to enforce those duties [created by the challenged law] in this 
litigation.”).    
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not.  According to the House rules, BLAG can direct the House Office of the 
General Counsel to file amicus briefs” in cases involving the House’s interests” 
but must “call for legislation or a House resolution” to “authorize[e] the General 
Counsel to represent the House itself.”52  There is no such resolution regarding 
DOMA.
53
  Indeed, two of BLAG’s five members opposed the use of House 
resources to defend DOMA,
54
 and 133 members of the House filed an amicus 
curiae brief in the First Circuit maintaining that DOMA is unconstitutional.
55
  
Congress also has not authorized BLAG to represent the federal governments 
interests.
56
  The easy equation that some have made between BLAG and the House 
of Representatives thus finds no support in the facts. 
III. The Article III Questions:  Government’s Mantle and Injury in Fact  
 
Our inquiry must continue because being granted intervenor status does not, of 
itself, secure federal jurisdiction.
57
  Particularly where an intervenor is the only 
                                                          
52
  See Martin O. James, Congressional Oversight 122 (2002) (“The office may appear as amicus 
curiae on behalf of the Speaker and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group in litigation involving the 
institutional interests of the House. Where authorized by statute or resolution, the general counsel 
may represent the House itself in judicial proceedings.").  Indeed, 28 U.S.C. §530D, in requiring 
the Attorney General to notify Congress if the Executive Branch declines to defend a law, specifies 
that notification must be completed “within such time as will reasonable enable the House of 
Representatives and the Senate to take action, separately or jointly, to intervene in timely fashion in 
the proceeding.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
53
  Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930 n.5 (1983) (noting that full House and Senate had 
authorized intervention via resolution).  For discussion of the ways in which the House might 
authorize action, see Walker v. Cheney, 230 F.Supp.2d 51, 70 (D.D.C. 2002) (discussing cases 
where "the relevant House of Congress had also passed a resolution expressly endorsing pursuit of 
the lawsuit"). 
54
  See supra note xx. 
55
   Amicus Br. Of Members of the House of Representatives, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health and Human Svcs., Hos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 3, 2011). 
56
  For more on this point, see Matthew Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law 
Litigation, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1539, 1576-78 (2012).  There are additional important questions 
regarding whether the House, or even the full Congress, can legitimately intervene to defend a 
federal law.  As the Court suggested in United States v. Providence Journal Col, 485 U.S. 693, 701 
(1988), “[i]t seems to be elementary that even when exercising distinct and jealously separated 
powers, the three branches are but ‘co-ordinate parts of one government.’” (citations omitted).  See 
also 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 517, 518, and 519 (providing that the Attorney General shall direct all 
litigation in which the United States has interests).    
57
  See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (“[A]n intervenor's right to continue a suit in 
the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by 
the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.”) (citing Mine Workers v. Eagle-Picher 
Mining & Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335, 339 (1945); Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 368 (1980)). As 
David Shapiro explained, 
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party to seek an appeal in federal court, it must have Article III standing just like 
any other party.
58
  
 
So, we arrive at our constitutional question: can a ballot initiative proponent or 
elected officials who has survived the intervention hurdle also satisfy Article III’s 
standing requirements for purposes of defending a challenged enactment.  As 
noted earlier, this question breaks into two – first, whether these actors can derive 
their standing from the government, and second, whether they have their own 
particularized interest that suffices to establish standing.   
 
Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Governments – A Quick Primer on Standing 
 
Typical discussions of Article III standing, which arise mainly regarding 
plaintiffs,
59
 stress that parties seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must establish:  
                                                                                                                                                                
 A distinction between standing to intervene and to appeal makes particular sense when the 
“case or controversy” limitation on the federal judicial power is recalled. Adding C to the 
litigation between A and B may pose no problems under Article III of the Constitution, but 
permitting C to be the sole adversary of B on appeal, when his interest in the case may be only 
in its value as precedent, certainly does give difficulty since there is no real controversy 
between A and C. 
David Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 
Harv.L.Rev. 721, 753-54 (1968). 
58
  See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (“Standing to sue or defend is 
an aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 
54, 56 (1986) (same regarding standing to defend).  The Court has acknowledged that if existing 
parties have Article III standing, additional parties need not necessarily satisfy standing 
requirements themselves.  See Diamond at 64 (“Had the State sought review, this Court's Rule 10.4 
makes clear that Diamond, as an intervening defendant below, also would be entitled to seek 
review, enabling him to file a brief on the merits, and to seek leave to argue orally. But this ability 
to ride “piggyback” on the State's undoubted standing exists only if the State is in fact an appellant 
before the Court; in the absence of the State in that capacity, there is no case for Diamond to 
join.”); cf. Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981) (finding that it was not 
necessary to decide standing of other plaintiffs  because one plaintiff was found to have standing); 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 & n. 9 (1977) (same). 
Indeed, the circuits have split over whether proposed intervenors must establish Article III 
standing in addition to satisfying Rule 24’s requirements.  See, e.g., Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68 
(“[T]he precise relationship between the interest required to satisfy the Rule and the interest 
required to confer standing, has led to anomalous decisions in the Courts of Appeals”) (citing 
divergent circuit court cases); id. at 68-69 (“We need not decide today whether a party seeking to 
intervene before a District Court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also 
the requirements of Art. III.”); McConnell v FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) (plurality op.), rev’d on 
other grounds by Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that 
because existing defendant has standing, “we need not address the standing of the intervenor-
defendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC's”) (citations omitted). 
59
  See supra text at xx. 
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“(1) an injury in fact (i.e. a “concrete and particularized” invasion of a “legally 
protected interest”); (2) causation (i.e. a ‘’fairly . . . trace[able]’” connection 
between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and 
(3) redressability (i.e., it is ‘”likely”’ and not ‘merely “speculative”’ that the 
plaintiff’s injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit.”60   
 
While some of these concerns are particular to plaintiffs, the Court has 
reinforced that, even for defendant-intervenors, having a “’direct stake in the 
outcome’” remains critical.61  The Court has insisted, further, that federal litigation 
“is not to be placed in the hands of ‘concerned bystanders’ who will use it simply 
as a ‘vehicle for the vindication of value interests.’”62   
Separately, the Court has made clear that governments have standing to defend 
their own laws, including via intervention.  Indeed, perhaps because the point 
seems so obvious, there is relatively little discussion of it in the case law.  As the 
Supreme Court explained matter-of-factly in Maine v. Taylor, “a State clearly has 
a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes.”63  For this 
reason, the Court permitted Maine to obtain Supreme Court review of a federal 
prosecution that had led a circuit court to invalidate a state law, even though the 
                                                          
60
  Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Svcs, 554 U.S. 269, 273 (2008) (quoting Lujan at 
560-61).  In addition, the Court has several prudential grounds for limiting standing.  See Elk 
Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (describing these grounds, which 
include limitations on third-party standing, as “judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction”).  In the context of initiative proponents, third-party standing is not at issue.  
Instead, the alternate claims are that the initiative proponents are functioning as the government’s 
authorized representatives or that the proponents’ own interests have been infringed in ways that 
justify federal jurisdiction.   
In all instances, the party that seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden to 
establish standing.  For cases making this point in the context of plaintiffs seeking review, see, e.g., 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“[W]hether the plaintiff has made out a ‘case or 
controversy’ between himself and the defendant is the threshold question in every federal case, 
determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.”); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 
U.S. 332, 335  (2006) (reiterating that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim [s]he 
seeks to press”).  For discussion of intervenor’s burden to establish standing to pursue an appeal, 
see infra at xx.    
61
  Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 63 (1986) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 
(1972).   
62
  Id. (quoting U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). 
63
  Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986).   See also Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 848 
F.2d 720, 723 (6
th
 Cir. 1988) (same).  Not surprisingly, there are few cases that make this 
observation explicitly.  In nearly all cases, the point that states have standing to defend their own 
laws is taken as obvious for the reasons discussed supra at xx.   
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federal government had declined to pursue its own appeal.
64
  Likewise, in rejecting 
a private actor’s effort to defend a state law in Diamond v. Charles, the Court 
observed that “[b]ecause the State alone is entitled to create a legal code, only the 
State has the kind of ‘direct stake’ identified in Sierra Club [] in defending the 
standards embodied in that code.”65  Federal statutory law also reflects the 
importance of the state’s interest in defending its own laws, authorizing states to 
intervene in federal litigation whenever “the constitutionality of any statute of that 
State affecting the public interest is drawn in question.”66   
The Limits of Formal Delegation  
 
If only formal conferral was necessary for governments to confer Article III 
standing to others, the questions on which this Essay focuses could be resolved 
simply.  Although issues particular to the putative delegations to Proposition 8’s 
proponents in Perry or to BLAG in Windsor and the other DOMA cases would 
remain,
67
 there would be little need for extended discussion here. 
 
But statutory conferral of standing, in itself, is not sufficient to satisfy Article 
III.  Indeed, it is “settled that Congress cannot erase Article III's standing 
                                                          
64
  The case arose from the federal government’s prosecution of a bait-seller under a federal statute 
that made it a crime to import fish or wildlife in violation of state law.  Maine intervened, pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. sec. 2403(b), which authorizes states to intervene in federal proceedings where the 
constitutionality of state laws is challenged.   After the First Circuit invalidated the Maine bait law 
that underlay the prosecution, the federal government noticed an appeal to the Supreme Court but 
then dismissed its appeal voluntarily.  Maine, 477 U.S. at 137 n.5. 
65
  Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. at 65.  See also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. 
Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982) (explaining that creation and enforcement of a civil and criminal 
code is an “easily identified” sovereign interest). 
66
  28 U.S.C. §2403(b).  The statute provides in full:   
In any action, suit, or proceeding in a court of the United States to which a State or any 
agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any 
statute of that State affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify 
such fact to the attorney general of the State, and shall permit the State to intervene for 
presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument 
on the question of constitutionality. The State shall, subject to the applicable provisions of 
law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs 
to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the 
question of constitutionality. 
Id. 
67
  See infra at xx. 
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requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not 
otherwise have standing.”68   
 
This is not to say that jurisdictional conferrals are entirely unimportant.  
Indeed, the Court has indicated that, at the federal level, they can “eliminate[] any 
prudential standing limitations and significantly lessen[] the risk of unwanted 
conflict with the Legislative Branch when that plaintiff brings suit.”69  At the state 
level too, they seem to provide some assurance related to standing, or, perhaps 
more accurately, their absence is noteworthy.  In considering initiative proponents’ 
standing to defend Arizonan’s official-English rule, for example, the Court noted 
pointedly that it was” aware of no Arizona law appointing initiative sponsors as 
agents of the people of Arizona to defend, in lieu of public officials, the 
constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State.”70  And in a case involving a 
New Jersey minute-of-silence law, the Court, in recognizing Article III standing, 
deemed it important that “state law authorize[d] legislators to represent the State's 
interests.”71   
 
Indeed, presumably it was in response to the Court’s Arizonans ruling that the 
Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme Court to determine whether 
Proposition 8’s proponents had authorization to stand in the government’s stead. 72  
                                                          
68
  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 
U.S. 91, 100(1979)).  See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rts. Org, 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1972) 
(“The plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury 
shared by a large class of other possible litigants.’”) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S., at 501).  
 In the 2011 term, the Court dismissed as improvidently granted a case raising the question 
whether Article III jurisdiction arises in circumstances where the plaintiff would not have to 
establish an actual financial injury to prevail in obtaining statutory damages.  See First American 
Financial Corp., 610 F.3d 514 (2011) (granting Article III standing for damages under the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act where plaintiff did not have to show actual financial injury), cert 
dismissed as improvidently granted by First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S.Ct. 2536 
(2012). 
69
  Raines at 820 n.3.  See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930, n. 5, 939-940 (1983) (holding 
Congress a proper party to defend a statute’s validity where both Houses, by resolution, had 
authorized intervention in the lawsuit). 
70
  Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997). 
71
  See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987) 
72
  The proponents had “claim[e]d to assert the interest of the People of California in the 
constitutionality of Proposition 8, which the People themselves enacted.”  Perry at 1072.  In 
situating its analysis of the proponents’ standing, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the Arizonans 
case, citing the Supreme Court’s “‘grave doubts’ about the sponsors' standing” because there had 
been no legislative authorization.  Id. (citing Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65-66).   
The Ninth Circuit had certified this question to the California Supreme Court: 
Whether under Article II, Section 8 of the California Constitution, or otherwise under 
California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure possess either a 
particularized interest in the initiative's validity or the authority to assert the State's interest 
23 
 
The California court held that they did.
73
  BLAG, by contrast, does not have 
formal authorization from the House of Representatives
74
 although no court to date 
has deemed that absence significant.  
 
The Government-Mantle Theory of Standing and the Legislature-as-a-Whole 
 
Since formal authorization alone does not satisfy Article III, the next question 
we must address is whether individuals and organizations that seek to defend 
official enactments can derive their standing from the government’s standing to 
defend its own laws.  In theory, this could be accomplished either by the 
government delegating its standing or by others taking up the government’s mantle 
and stepping into legislative-defense role voluntarily in the government’s absence.  
The discussion in the sections that follow will begin by considering the arguments 
favoring these sorts of standing transfers.  My ultimate argument, though, is that 
the government-mantle theory, while conceivably viable for legislatures as a 
whole, is neither doctrinally permissible nor normatively sensible for others. 
 
Thus far, the Supreme Court has kept a tight constraint on government stand-
ins for Article III purposes, recognizing full legislatures, but few others, as 
qualified federal court litigants.  Although it has offered almost no explanation, the 
Court seems to believe that the lawmaking body should be able to defend its work 
if the executive branch does not.  In the New Jersey minute-of-silence case, for 
example, the Court allowed a circuit decision to stand where the state’s Attorney 
General had declined to defend the law and the state General Assembly speaker 
and Senate president had obtained authorization to intervene on the legislature’s 
                                                                                                                                                                
in the initiative's validity, which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the 
initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when the 
public officials charged with that duty refuse to do so. 
Perry, 631 F.3d 1052 (9
th
 Cir. 2012).  Cf. id. at 1072 (“The State's highest court thus held that 
California law provides precisely what the Arizonans Court found lacking in Arizona law: it 
confers on the official proponents of an initiative the authority to assert the State's interests in 
defending the constitutionality of that initiative, where the state officials who would ordinarily 
assume that responsibility choose not to do so.”). 
73
  It wrote that “under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution and the relevant provisions 
of the Elections Code, the official proponents of a voter-approved initiative measure are authorized 
to assert the state's interest in the initiative's validity, enabling the proponents to defend the 
constitutionality of the initiative and to appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative.”  Perry v. 
Brown, 52 Cal.4
th
 116, xx (2011).  “[T]he role played by the proponents in such litigation,” the 
court explained, “is comparable to the role ordinarily played by the Attorney General or other 
public officials in vigorously defending a duly enacted state law and raising all arguable legal 
theories upon which a challenged provision may be sustained.” Id. at 525.  
74
  See supra at xx. 
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behalf.
75
   
 
Similarly, the Court has accepted that Congress, with proper authorization, can 
step in to defend a statute, consistent with Article III, if the executive branch or 
one of its agencies accepts the plaintiff’s contention that the challenged measure is 
unconstitutional.  In INS v. Chadha, the Court wrote, regarding Congress’s 
intervention where the INS declined to defend an immigration statute, that “[w]e 
have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute 
when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, 
agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”76     
 
Allowing the legislature as a whole to step into the government’s shoes for 
Article III purposes is arguably consistent with governments’ standing to intervene 
in defense of their own laws – any time a statute is challenged, the government’s 
enforcement powers are at risk of diminishment.  While the legislature does not 
have its own enforcement powers, one could reasonably argue that the government 
mantle can apply because its lawmaking responsibilities satisfy Article III’s “direct 
stake” requirement.77    
 
 
                                                          
75
  Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987).  The Court wrote, simply, that “the New Jersey 
Legislature had authority under state law to represent the State's interests in both the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals.” Id.  Describing the ruling later, the Court wrote that “[w]e have 
recognized that state legislators have standing to contest a decision holding a state statute 
unconstitutional if state law authorizes legislators to represent the State's interests.”  Arizonans, 520 
U.S. at 65.  It is hard to know whether this broader characterization, which refers to “legislators” 
rather than the legislature, was intentional, but given the absence of any acknowledgment or 
explanation and the dissonance with other doctrine, it is unlikely that the Court in Arizonans 
intended to expand Karcher’s reach.    
76
  462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983).  Interestingly, neither of the two cases cited in support of this 
proposition is actually on point.  Instead, one of the cases, Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S., at 
210 n. 9, indicates in the cited footnote only that the Court had appointed a member of the Supreme 
Court bar to present argument as amicus curiae defending the challenged law when the agency had 
aligned itself with the petitioner.  Id. (The entire footnote reads:  Since the Immigration Service had 
aligned itself with petitioner on this question, the Court invited William H. Dempsey, Jr., Esquire, a 
member of the Bar of this Court, to appear and present oral argument as amicus curiae in support of 
the judgment below).  The other, United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), does not discuss 
standing at all.  
Given that the Court reinforced the Congress-as-proper-party point in Arizonans, the 
absence of meaningful precedential support in Chadha might not be as troubling as it seems.  See 
Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65n.20.   
 
77
  My tentative view is that this argument is not persuasive for reasons related to those the Court 
gave in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) regarding the U.S. government’s 
institutional design, see infra at xx, but fuller discussion of this point is beyond the scope here. 
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Individual Legislators, Legislative Subgroups, and the Limits of the 
Government-Mantle Theory  
 
If a legislature can establish Article III standing to defend its enactments, then 
why not individual legislators who supported, and perhaps even led the charge to 
have a challenged measure enacted?  Here, the Court has drawn a sharp line, 
rejecting federal jurisdiction even for legislators who have statutory support for 
their intervention, unless those legislators seek federal jurisdiction for a narrow set 
of actions related to the voting process rather than outcomes. 
 
This issue – and the contrast between full legislature’s and individual 
legislators’ standing to invoke federal jurisdiction in constitutional litigation 
regarding government enactments  – arose most starkly in Raines v. Byrd, where 
six members of Congress had statutory authorization to challenge the Line Item 
Veto Act on constitutional grounds.
78
  To establish Article III standing, the 
members argued that the veto law diminished their political power.  The Court, 
however, rejected the plaintiffs’ institutional injury assertion as “wholly abstract 
and widely dispersed,” holding that “these individual members of Congress do not 
have a sufficient ‘personal stake’ in this dispute and have not alleged a sufficiently 
concrete injury to have standing.” 79  
                                                          
78
  521 U.S. 811 (1997).  The Act provided that “[a]ny Member of Congress or any individual 
adversely affected by [this Act] may bring an action, in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that any 
provision of this part violates the Constitution.” Id. at 815-16 (discussing § 692(a)(1)). 
79
  Id. at 830.  See also Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 543-544 (1986) 
(holding that a school board member who “has no personal stake in the outcome of the litigation” 
lacked standing); U.S. v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7 (1892) (“The two houses of Congress are legislative 
bodies representing larger constituencies.  Power is not vested in any one individual, but in the 
aggregate of the members who compose the body, and its action is not the action of any separate 
members or number of members, but the action of the body as a whole.”).  Cf. Nevada Comm. On 
Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S.Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011) (“’[T]he legislator casts his vote ‘as trustee for his 
constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power.’  In this respect, voting by a legislator is 
different from voting by a citizen.  While ‘a voter’s franchise is a personal right,’ ‘[t]he procedures 
for voting in legislative assemblies . . . pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political 
representatives executing the legislative process.’”) (internal citations omitted); Bond v. United 
States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011) (“compar[ing] Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 433–
436 (1998) (injured parties have standing to challenge Presidential line-item veto) with Raines v. 
Byrd,521 U.S. 811, 829–83 (1997) (Congress Members do not). 
Lower courts have also long concluded that an individual’s status as an elected official 
does not itself confer Article III standing.  See, e.g., Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 
(D.C.Cir.1973) (denying standing to a member of House of Representatives who sought a 
declaratory judgment barring certain illegal activities by the Central Intelligence Agency); 
Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding that members of House of 
Representatives lacked standing to challenge funding expenditure for military action in Southeast 
Asia); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2nd Cir. 1973) (holding that member of 
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Similarly, the Court summarily affirmed a three-judge district court that found 
no Article III standing where a senator sought to carry out “his special 
[institutional] duties and responsibilities” and had statutory authorization to bring 
suit in federal court.
80
  Noting that the decision to appoint Judge Mikva did not 
diminish the effectiveness of the senator’s vote or otherwise injure his interests, 
the district court concluded that individual members of Congress were “powerless 
to procure” federal standing in this way, and that Congressional authorization to 
file suit could not confer on them “a ‘right’ to seek a decision from a federal 
court.”81  
While individual legislators cannot claim the government’s mantle for 
enforcement purposes, the Supreme Court has found that they can invoke federal 
jurisdiction to protect the voting process and their own election.  That is, their 
roles enable them to establish a “direct stake” in the lawmaking process even if 
they cannot claim that stake in the outcomes.  For example, in Coleman v. Miller, 
the Court found Article III standing for a group of legislators who challenged the 
process by which the state legislature ratified a proposed U.S. constitutional 
amendment regarding child labor.
82
  Still, exhibiting some sensitivity to having 
                                                                                                                                                                
House of Representatives lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment barring military action in 
Cambodia).  Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 512-514, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1950-1951, 
1959-1960, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) (finding standing for a Member of Congress on the ground that 
he suffered a concrete and personal injury when he was barred from taking his seat, and his salary, 
in the House of Representatives). 
80
  McClure v. Carter, 513 F.Supp. 265, 270, 266 n.1 (D. Idaho 1981), aff’d sub nom McClure v. 
Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981). 
81
  513 F.Supp. at 271 (D. Idaho 1981).  Nor can former legislators take advantage of the 
governmental-standing mantle.  See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 81 (1987) (“Karcher and 
Orechio participated in this lawsuit in their official capacities  as presiding officers of the New 
Jersey Legislature, but since they no longer hold those offices, they lack authority to pursue this 
appeal on behalf of the legislature.”). 
82
 307 U.S. 433 (1939). In Raines v. Byrd, the Court discussed the procedural defects at issue in 
Coleman at some length: 
 With the vote deadlocked 20 to 20, the amendment ordinarily would not have been ratified. 
However, the State's Lieutenant Governor, the presiding officer of the State Senate, cast a 
deciding vote in favor of the amendment, and it was deemed ratified (after the State House of 
Representatives voted to ratify it). The 20 State Senators who had voted against the 
amendment, joined by a 21st State Senator and three State House Members, filed an action in 
the Kansas Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus that would compel the appropriate 
state officials to recognize that the legislature had not in fact ratified the amendment. That 
court held that the members of the legislature had standing to bring their mandamus action, but 
ruled against them on the merits.  
This Court affirmed. By a vote of 5-4, we held that the members of the legislature had 
standing. In explaining our holding, we repeatedly emphasized that if these legislators (who 
were suing as a bloc) were correct on the merits, then their votes not to ratify the amendment 
were deprived of all validity. 
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allowed individual legislators to achieve Article III standing, even related to the 
voting process, the Court later stressed that Coleman was “[t]he one case in which 
we have upheld standing for legislators (albeit state legislators) claiming an 
institutional injury.”83  To achieve Article III standing under Coleman, the Court 
also suggested that legislators would have to “allege[] that they voted for a specific 
bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the bill was 
nonetheless deemed defeated.”84 
 
The other oft-cited case to support individual legislator standing, Powell v. 
McCormack,
85
 is even more limited.  There, Representative Adam Clayton Powell 
succeeded in establishing Article III standing but only because he suffered an 
individualized and concrete injury of the sort easily recognized by standard 
doctrine when he was barred from taking his seat and salary in the House of 
Representatives after having been duly elected.
86
  
Whither BLAG? 
  
As the case law just discussed makes plain, BLAG, as a subgroup of the House 
of Representatives, or even as the official representative of the House,
87
  is not 
well positioned to claim Article III standing to defend DOMA.
88
  The reason, 
again, is that it cannot claim the government’s enforcement powers; nor can the 
government’s decisions about enforcement strategy be said to present the sort of 
                                                                                                                                                                
Raines, 511 U.S. at 822 (footnote and citation omitted).  
83
  Raines, 521 U.S. 811, 821.  The Court added:  “It is obvious, then, that our holding in Coleman 
stands (at most, see n. 8, infra ) for the proposition that legislators whose votes would have been 
sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action 
goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely 
nullified.”  Id. at 822.  See also Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern Kansas v. 
Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that ten legislators lacked standing to seek 
enforcement of abortion restrictions and describing Coleman as limiting legislator standing to cases 
involving alleged “distortion of the legislative process” and not authorizing standing for legislators 
who object on constitutional grounds to a properly enacted law).   
84
  Raines, 521 U.S. at 824. 
85
  395 U.S. 486 (1969).  
86
  Id. at 512-14 (1969).  
87
  There is no apparent support for BLAG having this representative status.  See supra xx. 
88
  Unlike in Perry, where the intervenors’ inability to attain Article III standing requires dismissal, 
see infra, there is a strong argument that the Supreme Court retains jurisdiction to hear Windsor, 
even without BLAG having its own Article III standing.  The United States is subject to a court 
order requiring reimbursement of taxes to Edie Windsor, the plaintiff-respondent.  In addition, its 
enforcement powers are diminished by DOMA’s invalidation, even if it is in agreement with that 
determination.  I do not address the Supreme Court’s related jurisdictional question in Windsor 
regarding “[w]hether the Executive Branch’s agreement with the court below that DOMA is 
unconstitutional deprives this Court of jurisdiction to decide this case” as it discussion of it would 
extend well beyond this essay’s scope.    
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limited process-based challenges that have occasionally been permitted.
89
  
Presumably for this reason, most of BLAG’s prior involvement in other federal 
litigation has come in the form of amicus brief participation rather than through 
intervention seeking full party status.
90
 
 
Private Actors and the Government Mantle  
 
The question remains whether private actors can claim the government’s 
mantle, either with the government’s endorsement, as in Perry, or without.  
Because Perry presents the strongest version of this claim that governments can 
delegate their Article III standing, we will begin there and then consider the full 
array of arguments that might support individuals and organizations stepping in 
when government declines to defend a challenged law.  As will be quickly 
apparent, though, the doctrine leaves little room for private actors to establish the 
interest and injury required by Article III in this context, and the theories that 
might enable initiative proponents to stand out from among other private actors 
would, if accepted, undermine Article III as a meaningful limitation on federal 
jurisdiction. 
 
In recognizing Article III standing for the individuals and organization that 
sponsored Proposition 8,
91
 the Ninth Circuit wrote:  “All that matters, for federal 
standing purposes, is that the People have an interest in the validity of Proposition 
8 and that, under California law, Proponents are authorized to represent the 
People's interest.”92  Yet, as we know from the doctrine just discussed, neither the 
                                                          
89
  See supra xx. 
90
  See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd; Dickerson v. U.S.  Waxman v. Evans shows the limited nature of 
BLAG even more sharply.  In Waxman, which involved a suit by Congressional Democrats seeking 
access to census information, House members submitted two amicus briefs, each opposed to the 
other, with BLAG on one side and the House Democratic leadership on the other.  See Louis 
Fisher, The Politics of Executive Privilege 176 (2004).   
91
  The Ninth Circuit had to decide the standing question because the state of California did not 
appeal from the district court’s determination that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.  [cite] 
92
  Perry at 1073; see also id. at 1075 (“Because the State of California has Article III standing to 
defend the constitutionality of Proposition 8, and because both the California Constitution and 
California law authorize ‘the official proponents of [an] initiative ... to appear and assert the state's 
interest in the initiative's validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure when the 
public officials who ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a judgment decline to do so,’ we 
conclude that Proponents are proper appellants here.”) (internal citation omitted).  Regarding this 
authorization, the Ninth Circuit added that “[t]he People of California are largely free to structure 
their system of governance as they choose, and we respect their choice.”  Perry at 1073.  
 The court made a point of acknowledging, too, that state law could not sidestep Article III 
constraints.  Perry at 1074 (“To be clear, we do not suggest that state law has any “power directly 
to enlarge or contract federal jurisdiction.” Duchek v. Jacobi, 646 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir.1981). 
“Standing to sue in any Article III court is, of course, a federal question which does not depend on 
the party's ... standing in state court.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985).).   
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intervenor’s assertion of an interest nor the government’s authorization suffices to 
confer standing.
93
  Indeed, the Supreme Court has spoken quite pointedly against 
the easy attribution of standing to initiative proponents.  In addressing Arizona’s 
official-English initiative for a unanimous court, Justice Ginsburg confirmed that 
“this Court has never identified initiative proponents as Article-III-qualified 
defenders.”94 
 
Private actors seeking to insure that the laws and Constitution are properly 
enforced outside the initiative context fare no better vis a vis Article III.  In fact, 
the Court has repeatedly affirmed that “[a]n interest shared generally with the 
public at large in the proper application of the Constitution and laws will not do.”95  
Nearly a century ago, the Court faced the issue of private actors seeking to ensure 
government accountability in a suit by a citizen who was also a taxpayer and a 
member of the American Constitution League to challenge the Nineteenth 
Amendment’s ratification process.96  Although the plaintiff claimed injury in that 
“[f]ree citizens would be deprived of their right to have such elections duly held, 
the effectiveness of their votes would be diminished, and election expenses would 
be nearly doubled,” the Court found that he lacked a sufficient interest for Article 
III standing.
97
   
 
Some decades later, the Court reinforced the point in rejecting taxpayer 
standing to challenge a state law, explaining that the party invoking federal 
jurisdiction “must be able to show . . . that he has sustained . . . some direct injury . 
. . and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people 
generally.’”98  And again, the Court reinforced that generalized grievances are 
                                                          
93
  See supra at xx. 
94
  Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997). 
95
  Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-576).  Similarly, in In Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) 
(per curiam), the Supreme Court found no Article III standing for a member of the Supreme Court 
bar who sought to challenge Justice Black’s appointment based on the Constitution’s Ineligibility 
Clause.  The Court explained: 
 It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial 
power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has 
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that 
action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members 
of the public.  
Id. at 634. 
96
  Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922). 
97
  Id. at 127, 129. 
98
  Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (citation omitted).  Not 
surprisingly, then, “when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction 
he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to 
establish.”  Lujan at 562 (citations omitted).   
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insufficient for standing purposes in response to a federal taxpayer who sought 
information about the Central Intelligence Agency’s expenditures pursuant to the 
Constitution’s Statement and Account Clause so that he could “intelligently follow 
the actions of Congress or the Executive” and “properly fulfill his obligations as a 
member of the electorate in voting for candidates seeking national office.”99  As 
the Court reiterated, this desire to have the law enforced in a particular way “is 
surely [] a generalized grievance . . . since the impact on him is plainly 
undifferentiated and ‘common to all members of the public.’”100 
 
Individuals who have pursued what they perceived as the government’s 
interests by seeking to defend official enactments have similarly been deemed to 
lack an adequately individualized stake.  In Diamond v. Charles, for example, the 
Court rejected a doctor’s proposed intervention to defend a state abortion 
restriction on the ground that it was “simply an effort to compel the State to enact 
a code in accord with [the doctor’s] interests.”101  This “expression of a desire that 
[a law] as written be obeyed” is one available to the sovereign, which has a “direct 
stake” in defending its laws, but not to a citizen with no individualized injury.102 
 
But perhaps one might argue that initiative proponents are differently situated 
to pursue the government’s interests when they seek to enforce a law that they 
have sponsored, particularly when they have been authorized by the state, as 
Proposition 8’s proponents purportedly were.103  In particular, the qui tam cases 
might be invoked for support because the Court has permitted private actors to 
invoke federal jurisdiction in the course of actions seeking redress related to 
alleged fraud against the United States.
104
  In Vermont Agency of Natural 
Resources v. U.S. ex rel Stevens, for example, the Court acknowledged that the 
private actor, known as the relator, does not suffer an invasion of its own legally 
                                                          
99
  U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176 (1974). 
100
  Id. at 176-77 (quoting Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937). 
101
  Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986).   
102
  Id. at 66. 
103
  None of the statutes governing ballot initiative sponsors addresses, much less authorizes, those 
sponsors to defend “their” measure on the state’s behalf.   [cite]  Although the California Supreme 
Court construed them to do so and the Ninth Circuit accepted that construction, it is not clear that 
that construction is warranted.  [cite] 
104
  Most qui tam suits are brought under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §3279(a), which permits 
a private party, known as the “relator” to bring an action “for the person and for the United States 
Government” against a defendant who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer 
or employee of the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval.”  Three other statutes also allow for qui tam proceedings.  See Vermont Agency of 
Natural Resources v. U.S. ex rel Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000). 
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protected interest in a conventional sense.
 105
 Instead, the interest is that of the 
United States and “the ‘right’ he seeks to vindicate does not even fully materialize 
until the litigation is completed and the relator prevails.”106  But, the Court found, 
standing exists because the relator is a partial assignee of the United States’ fraud 
claim, so that, when the relator files, it is pursuing its own interests.
107
   
 
Unfortunately for initiative proponents, the government cannot assign the 
interests that give rise to standing in this context.  That is, while a government can 
assign its claim for financial compensation, as in the qui tam context, its 
enforcement powers are not similarly alienable.
108
   
 
Perhaps initiative proponents are more like representatives of the legislature 
than like assignees of the government, drawing on Karcher’s and Chadha’s 
acceptance of legislative bodies’ Article III standing. 109  Here, the argument would 
be that, like those leaders, the initiative proponents are preserving the voters’ 
power to see that their initiative-enacted laws are enforced.  The difficulties with 
this position, though, are several.  First, it is factually weak.  Sponsoring 
individuals and organizations are enthusiastic supporters of proposed legislation 
but they are not enactors.  That role belongs to the voting public.  As leading 
                                                          
105
  Id.  A concrete interest in the suit’s outcome, alone, is insufficient because, as the Court 
explained, that is not necessarily an interest related to an injury in fact – even someone who has 
wagered on the outcome of a lawsuit could be said to have a concrete interest.  Id.    
106
  Id. at 773.  See also id. (“[A]n interest that is merely a ‘byproduct’ of the suit itself cannot give 
rise to a cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes.”). 
107
 Id. at 773 (affirming “the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in 
fact suffered by the assignor”).  The Court elaborated this point in Sprint Communications Co., 
L.P. v. APCC Svcs., Inc., 544 U.S. 269 (2008), where assignees of payphone operators had brought 
compensation claims in federal court but had promised to pay proceeds from those claims to the 
assignor.  Reviewing historical practice in England and the U.S., the Court observed that “[w]here 
assignment at issue, courts . . . have always permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; 
and . . . there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection.”  Id. at 286.  The 
Court reinforced the point by reference to Vermont Agency, reiterating that, in the context of qui 
tam claims, private actors standing arises from its possessing an assigned interest from the United 
States.  Id. See also id. at 289  (describing assignment as conferring a “property right”); 290 
(describing assignees as asserting “legal rights of their own”) (emphasis in original).   
108
  Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially 
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.’”) (citation omitted). 
109
  A separate argument might seek to recognize initiative sponsors as an alternate legal defense 
team for the state when the usual defense group is not available.  Cf. Perry v. Brown, 134 
Cal.Rptr.3d at 525 (“[T]he role played by the proponents in such litigation,” the court explained, 
“is comparable to the role ordinarily played by the Attorney General or other public officials in 
vigorously defending a duly enacted state law and raising all arguable legal theories upon which a 
challenged provision may be sustained.”).  This is not a reading that the Ninth Circuit embraced, 
see supra, nor could it have, since counsel to a party does not have standing to pursue an appeal 
that the party itself declines to pursue.  See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 458 U.S. at 751 (requiring that a 
party “allege personal injury”) (emphasis added).   
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supporters, proponents are more like individual lawmakers – perhaps closest to the 
lead sponsor of a piece of legislation. And individual lawmakers, as we know, may 
have a cognizable interest in the voting process
110
 but they do not have Article III 
jurisdiction for claims that would have the state enforce its laws in a particular 
way.   
 
Second, there is nothing in the initiative process framework to justify treating 
proponents as the voters’ proxy in litigation, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s 
suggestion in Perry that ballot measure sponsors have special, distinguishing 
responsibilities.
111
  Unlike in legislatures, where governing rules frequently 
designate the leadership to appear on the body’s behalf in a range of proceedings, 
initiative statutes focus almost entirely on the steps in the process – how many 
signatures must sponsors obtain to put a measure on the ballot; how those 
signatures will be assessed; what sorts of information goes into a voter guide; 
etc.
112
  Not a single provision bears remotely on enforcement, or even defense, of a 
proposed measure.  Against this background, the state could conceivably designate 
anyone in the voting population, or even anyone at all, to handle the voters-as-
lawmakers enforcement action.  After all, even from within the process-focused 
rules, there is no requirement that the initiative sponsor be either the most effective 
or the most generous initiative supporter or the one, for that matter, that the voters 
would have chosen.
113
   
  
In this sense, the initiative process laws on which Perry relied to distinguish 
Proposition 8’s proponents from the measures’ other supporters are most 
analogous to provisions that set out the legislature’s lawmaking processes.  It is 
not a serious argument that these sorts of measures should help an individual 
legislator overcome the standing hurdle to defend a measure enacted according to 
these processes; nor should it be that the analogous voter initiative provisions give 
official sponsors access to federal jurisdiction once the initiative has passed. 
 
To be sure, ballot measure proponents and individuals and organizations 
involved with lobbying efforts for legislation stand out from the general public 
                                                          
110
  See supra at xx (discussing Coleman v. Miller). 
111
  See supra at note xx and accompanying text.  See also Perry v. Brown, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d at xx) 
(describing initiative proponents as “the most obvious and logical persons to assert the state’s 
interest,” because of their unique legal status in relation to the initiative). 
112
  [cite] 
113
   The “single-subject rule” that is typically part of a voter initiative framework would likely 
preclude sponsors from merging into the measure a vote on who would represent the voters’ 
interests if the state declined enforcement .  Cf. William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay 
Ballot Initiative Challenges:  Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct 
Democracy,  55 Ohio St. L. Rev. 583 (1994). 
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because of their involvement in getting a particular piece of legislation passed.  
But dedication of time and resources also cannot be what confers Article III 
standing on proponents to defend the measures they help pass.  If it were enough, 
then there should be no difference between the official ballot sponsors and other, 
non-official initiative supporters that make equivalent contributions.
114
  In effect, 
then, returning to where this Essay started, the state could choose anyone in 
Defendantville to do the job of representing the voters.   
 
Still, even if we accept initiative sponsors as the voters’ representatives, the 
requisite interest for Article III standing does not follow because the voters would 
be seeking federal jurisdiction for the purpose of having the state enforce the law 
consistent with their preferences.  That aim, as discussed above, is precisely the 
sort of “generalized grievance” that the Court has rejected in the past as 
                                                          
114
  Indeed, alternative frameworks might award of standing to whoever is deemed to have 
contributed most financially or otherwise.  One can easily imagine scenarios where an organization 
that rushed to become a measure’s official sponsor turned out not to take leadership of the initiative 
campaign or even, conceivably, to support the initiative at election time.  For obvious reasons, 
formal deference to official sponsorship might not make sense but neither would having a court try 
to sift among competing proponents to select one for the grant of standing.  A resort to random 
selection would likewise present many difficulties, as would the option of open-door participation. 
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insufficiently particularized.
115
   
 
None of this is to say that states must keep initiative proponents, organizational 
advocates, or even taxpayers from intervening to defend state laws in state courts.  
To the contrary, as the Supreme Court has made clear repeatedly, state courts are 
not burdened by Article III’s constraints.116  But it is to say that a state cannot, 
even with the best of intentions, extend its sovereignty to a private actor for 
purposes of standing in federal court. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
115
  See supra at xx; Lujan, at 573-74 (stating that an abstract interest in the government’s “proper 
application of the Constitution and laws” cannot justify Article III standing); FEC v. Akins 
(rejecting individual enforcement of general constitutional provisions); U.S. v. Richardson, 418 
U.S. 166, 178 (1974) (finding no Article III standing for individuals “to invoke the judicial power 
to determine the validity of executive or legislative action” based on “a general interest common to 
all members of the public”) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). 
Further, if we accept that the voters-as-lawmakers are entitled to access federal court to defend 
their initiatives, it is not clear why they could not access federal court to assert their interests in 
other ways, including to defend measures enacted by elected representatives or even to demand 
particular types of legislation.  Surely the voters have as much stake as their elected representatives 
in defending enacted measures and in the legislative process working properly; the distinction 
between direct and representative democracy should not make a difference for Article III purposes.  
Yet to permit voter standing in these circumstances, even by someone purporting to represent 
voters at large would be, again, to open the federal courts to those with non-particularized interests.  
It could even follow, arguably, that the authority to stand in for the legislature’s interests should be 
available to anyone purporting to represent the lawmaking body, whether in or outside of the 
legislature.  While it might be logical and convenient to reserve that role to the legislative body’s 
leadership, it cannot be that the state’s grant of permission is the linchpin for representative 
standing without conceding, contrary to decades of standing jurisprudence, that governments can 
legislature around the strictures of Article III.  [more to come] 
In addition, allowing the voters to “take their state to court,” in effect, by giving them the 
authority to act on the state’s behalf arguably creates a Pennhurst problem by permitting federal 
courts to adjudicate alleged violations of state law.  Although the California Supreme Court found 
that the state had consented to being represented by the initiative proponents, it is not clear that that 
consent satisfies the “clear waiver” requirement.  [cites] 
116
  Asarco v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often that the constraints of 
Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the 
limitations of a case or controversy”); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 113 (1983) 
(“[T]he state courts need not impose the same standing . . . that govern federal-court 
proceedings.”).  Cf. “Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804  (1985) (“Standing to sue 
in any Article III court is, of course, a federal question which does not depend on the party's ... 
standing in state court.”).      
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Beyond the mantle-of-government theory - the injury-in-fact problem for 
initiative proponents and legislators 
 
Given that legislators and initiative proponents cannot claim a governmental, 
or even quasi-governmental, interest, they must demonstrate another cognizable 
interest if they are to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction in defense of an initiated 
measure.  Yet for the reasons just discussed, participation in the political process, 
even as a ballot measure sponsor or lawmaker, does not give rise to the sort of 
distinctive, palpable interest that generates Article III standing.   
 
What about passion, then?
117
  The familiar doctrine bears repeating because, as 
explored further below, concerns about excluding a measure’s most passionate 
supporters seem to drive, at least subliminally, some of the judicial decision-
making in this area. 
 
The Court faced the question squarely over 40 years ago in Sierra Club v. 
Morton, when it rejected the position that a litigant could gain standing based 
either on its own commitment to an issue or as the representative of the 
commitments and interests of others.
118
  As the Court explained in the context of 
an environmental-protection suit brought under the Administrative Procedures Act, 
“a mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no 
matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient 
by itself to render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved.’”119  Since 
then, the Court has reiterated the point in other contexts, too, making clear that 
while an individual’s or organization’s interests might conflict sharply with the 
government or other adverse party, “motivation is not a substitute for the actual 
                                                          
117
  In most cases, litigants seeking federal court jurisdiction have suffered a palpable injury to their 
economic interests, obviating the need for extended discussion of standing in those contexts.  The 
Court has also been clear that infringement of non-economic rights can give rise to standing.  See 
Asarco v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 616 (1989) (“Our precedents demonstrate that a party may 
establish standing by raising claims of noneconomic injury.”) (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village 
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).   
However, “claims of injury that are purely abstract, even if they might be understood to 
lead to “the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with 
which one disagrees,” do not provide the kind of particular, direct, and concrete injury that is 
necessary to confer standing to sue in the federal courts.”  Id. (citation omitted).  In Asarco, the 
Court found that although teachers’ association members might have a particular interest in the 
state’s educational system, that interest did not distinguish them, for standing purposes, from 
others, including students, parents, and other citizens who might also be interested but would not 
have standing.  Id. 
118
  405 U.S. 727 (1972).  See id. at 736 (describing Sierra Club’s standing claim as resting on its 
“longstanding concern with and expertise in such matters” being “sufficient to give it standing as a 
‘representative of the public.’” (footnote omitted). 
119
  Id. at 739. 
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injury needed by the courts . . . .”120    
 
The Court’s explanation is as important as its conclusion because it shows why 
initiative proponents and legislators cannot possibly claim Article III standing by 
virtue of their heightened concern for the issue implicated by the measure they 
promoted.  “[I]f a ‘special interest’ in this subject were enough to entitle the Sierra 
Club to commence this litigation, there would appear to be no objective basis upon 
which to disallow a suit by any other bona fide ‘special interest’ organization 
however small or short-lived,” the Court wrote.121  It continued:  “And if any 
group with a bona fide ‘special interest’ could initiate such litigation, it is difficult 
to perceive why any individual citizen with the same bona fide special interest 
would not also be entitled to do so.”122 
 
IV. Procedural Legitimacy and the Costs of Exclusion    
 
One might ask, still, whether this is the system we want or, put another way, 
whether policy or other arguments ought to compel a rethinking of standing 
doctrine in this area.  I turn first to Court’s observations about this normative 
question and then consider how thinking about the question from non-
consequentialist and consequentialist perspectives might help.   
 
In U.S. v. Richardson, the Court confronted the consequences of its ruling that 
a private party lacked standing to demand that the Central Intelligence Agency act 
consistently with its constitutional obligation to provide an accounting of its 
expenditures because he had not suffered a personalized injury.
123
  “It can be 
argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can do so,” 
the Court acknowledged.  The same is true for Proposition 8 – if the state declines 
to defend and the measure’s proponents lack Article III standing, the litigation 
cannot properly continue past the district court.
124
  (The DOMA cases are 
                                                          
120
 Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, at 226.  See also id. at 225-26 (“the 
essence of standing ‘is not a question of motivation but of possession of the requisite . . . interest 
that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct.’”) (quoting Doremus v. 
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952); U.S. v. Richardson at 177 (“While we can hardly 
dispute that this respondent has a genuine interest in the use of funds and that his interest may be 
prompted by his status as a taxpayer, he has not alleged that, as a taxpayer, he is in danger of 
suffering any particular concrete injury as a result of the operation of this statute.”). 
121
  Sierra Club at 739. 
122
  Id. at 739-40. 
123
  418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
124
  There is no Article III problem in the district court because the parties invoking federal 
jurisdiction the suit alleged a concrete and particularized injury brought on by the state’s refusal to 
allow them to marry.  [cite]  Likewise, the fact that the governor and attorney general agreed with 
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positioned differently because the federal government has sought review in each 
case.)
125
    
 
The Court responded to what might seem a troubling result by situating it 
within the Framers’ political vision for the United States, with the allocation of 
some disputes to the judiciary and others to the political process. 
   
The Constitution created a representative Government with the representatives 
directly responsible to their constituents at stated periods of two, four, and six 
years; that the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of 
course, completely disable the citizen who is not satisfied with the ‘ground 
rules' established by the Congress for reporting expenditures of the Executive 
Branch.  Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction 
does not impair the right to assert his views in the political forum or at the 
polls.
126
  
 
Indeed, the Court’s observation is an important reminder that relaxing Article III’s 
constraints in the context of voter initiatives or other popular measures would have 
consequences that extend beyond the jurisprudential to the very nature of our 
government structure.  Somewhat dramatically, the Court proclaimed:  “Any other 
conclusion would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in 
the nature of an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee 
the conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts.”127  
 
Continuing, the Court made an observation that seems tailor-made for both 
BLAG and Proposition 8’s proponents: 
 
Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional electoral 
process may be thought at times, our system provides for changing 
members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a 
sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are 
delinquent in performing duties committed to them. 
 
In other words, when we step back to consider whether it might be best to ease 
Article III’s requirements in the voter initiative context, it bears remembering that 
far more is in play than the frustration of initiative supporters and supporters of a 
                                                                                                                                                                
the plaintiffs about Proposition 8’s invalidity did not vitiate the case or controversy within the 
meaning of Article III; only an injunction ordering the State not to enforce the measure could 
sufficiently remedy the plaintiffs’ alleged injury.    
125
  See supra n. xx. 
126
   U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179. 
127
  Id.   
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particular law if a federal appeal is foreclosed.   
 
Considering additional non-consequentialist and consequentialist arguments 
for and against allowing intervention and standing in these contexts proves useful, 
too.  On the non-consequentialist side, we could say that permitting private actors 
and legislators to participate in defending government action is a good in itself.  
For initiative proponents, the argument is strongest –the very point of the initiative 
process is to enable and encourage citizens to participate directly in government.  
This argument could also be extended to support inclusion of legislators and even 
citizen-lobbyists as defendants in suits regarding measures they supported.  It is 
reasonable to think that opening this part of the process could foster even greater 
civic engagement.  To return to the illustration from the Essay’s outset, if there 
really was a Defendantville, its inhabitants presumably would feel more a part of 
government if they knew they could not only advocate for laws but also defend 
those laws against post-enactment challenge challenges. 
 
More pragmatically, it seems obvious that those who are both highly 
passionate and knowledgeable about a particular measure are likely to bring robust 
arguments into the litigation process.  And, as the Ninth Circuit has pointed out, 
government cannot necessarily be counted on to do the same, particularly if it 
disagrees with the measure’s very merits.  Indeed, to the extent citizens turned to 
voter initiatives to avoid the legislature, it seems reasonable to assume that those 
same citizens will be more apt to fully illuminate issues and arguments that the 
reviewing court would want to consider.
128
   
 
Also obvious, particularly in the voter initiative context, is that blocking 
private actors from defending measures they have worked energetically to pass 
could have a range of negative public effects.
129
  Most directly, decisions along 
those lines may discourage others from becoming involved in the legislative 
process.  To the extent a state values its initiative system, as California does, this 
risk could be seen as substantial. 
 
Further, if courts are seen as shutting their doors to keep engaged citizens from 
defending “their” laws, the risk is not only disillusionment but also heightened 
distrust of the judiciary.  After all, the Article III concerns that would require such 
                                                          
128
  Yniguez at 733 (“The official sponsors of a ballot initiative have a strong interest in the vitality 
of a provision of the state constitution which they proposed and for which they vigorously 
campaigned. The district court's decision striking down Article XXVIII essentially nullified the 
considerable efforts AOE made to have the initiative placed on the ballot and to obtain its 
passage.”).  The California Supreme Court, among others, has made this point as well.  [cite]   
129
  Also, with respect to challenges to state law measures, the Article II concerns about 
diminishing the unitary executive if “outsiders” represent the government are not present. [cite] 
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a decision are not likely to come through sympathetically, if at all, in news media 
coverage.
130
  Indeed, general faith in government can only be hurt if the state or 
federal government refuses to defend a law and the initiative proponents or 
legislators who supported it are barred from taking an appeal if the measure is 
struck down. 
 
Countermajoritarian anxiety and guilt at work 
 
These points, taken together, help to explain why some courts, perhaps 
including the Ninth Circuit in Perry and the federal courts that have decided 
DOMA cases, deviate from the seemingly clear limitations imposed by the federal 
intervention rules and Article III when considering the role of initiative proponents 
and legislators in defending official enactments.  To put them into jurisprudentially 
familiar terms, we might say that these courts are being driven by a combination of 
countermajoritarian anxiety and countermajoritarian guilt.   
 
On the anxiety side, the fear is, as just noted, that the adjudication process will 
fall apart in some way if a ballot measure sponsor or subgroup of legislators is 
denied standing to appeal the measure’s invalidation, especially in circumstances 
where the government itself declines to appeal.
131
  The litigation might be 
diminished without the benefit of the proponents’ arguments and, further, the 
reputation of the court and the political process may suffer immeasurable damage 
by the proponents’ exclusion. 
 
Guilt seems also to be operative, especially in the voter initiative context.  
After all, stepping back from standing doctrine’s fine points, it can seem unfair, in 
a Lockean sense, to take those who labored to pass legislation and preclude them 
from defending their work.
132
  Strains of due process jurisprudence also reinforce 
this sense of countermajoritarian guilt, suggesting that it is procedurally as well as 
substantively unfair to deprive ballot measure sponsors or even voters
133
 of a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard in defense of the measure they helped pass.   
 
This anxiety and guilt, when left unexposed, risk obscuring the significant 
costs associated with allowing governments to delegate their authority to private 
actors and individual legislators.  Most fundamentally, private parties, no matter 
                                                          
130
  My own experience confirms that most reporters tend to avoid what they perceive as an “in the 
weeds” standing and jurisdictional questions, which are far less interesting to their audience than a 
measure’s subject matter and consequences in the world.    
131
  This anxiety is likely triggered even earlier, when courts are asked to allow these actors to 
intervene.     
132
  [cites to come] 
133
  [cites to come] As discussed supra, the same argument could apply to those who were involved 
in advocating for legislation that was enacted by lawmakers. 
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how engaged in the political process, are not subject to any of the accountability-
oriented limitations that are in place, formally and normatively, to constrain 
government actors.  There are no transparency requirements, few ethical 
limitations, and no obligation to carry forward the public interest rather than their 
own (or to take into account conflicting views of the public interest).  Even 
legislators, as individuals and in subgroups, are not subject to the same limitations 
as the government as a whole. 
 
Relatedly, and as a partial result of these constraints being absent, private 
parties and legislative subgroups are free to argue whatever they wish in the guise 
of government interests when they pursue appeals under the government’s mantle.  
So, for example, Proposition 8’s sponsors could freely argue that heterosexual 
parents should be privileged over gay parents
134
 even though California law and 
policy affirmatively rejected that position.  Indeed, Proposition 8’s sponsors could 
have argued – as state interests – that gay people are mentally ill, child molesters, 
and otherwise dangerous to society had they chosen to do so, notwithstanding that 
nothing in California law supports those positions.
135
  The same is true for 
BLAG.
136
  This setup presents its own sort of legitimacy risk, where courts can be 
seen as giving any group – regardless of how divisive – a governmental platform 
for advancing its views.   
 
Thus, just as it seems wrong to bar private actors and legislators from 
participating fully in a measure’s defense, so too does it seem wrong to allow those 
actors to function as the government when they do not share the government’s 
enforcement interest or accountability constraints.   
 
Procedural accommodations 
 
The question, then, is how, procedurally, to accommodate the assortment of 
concerns in play – fairness, guilt, anxiety, and judicial legitimacy writ large – 
together with the real constraints of intervention rules and Article III.  Simply 
condemning the concerns as unreasonable and advocating a hard doctrinal line will 
not do; after all, these concerns, articulated and not, are likely to influence the 
                                                          
134
  In fact, Proposition 8’s sponsors made this argument, asserting that  “children are better off 
when raised by two biological parents and that society can increase the likelihood of that family 
structure by allowing only potential biological parents—one man and one woman—to marry.”  
Perry, at 1096.  While this argument was not as overtly hostile to gay parents as similar claims 
from amicus Campaign for California Families, the result was, in effect, to advocate, on the state’s 
behalf, a legislative preference for heterosexual parents. 
135
  These two assertions, which once had much traction in antigay arguments, have long been 
considered empirically unsound in the United States.  See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sticky Intuitions 
and the Future of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 57 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1375 (2010).  
136
  [cites to come] 
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acceptability of any proposed solution. 
 
With respect to guilt, which is the more inward-looking of the strands of 
legitimacy concerns, it may help to recall that any deprivation caused to private 
parties is not categorical.  In the state court system, an initiative proponent or other 
private actor can participate in a state law’s defense as fully as the state will allow, 
entirely free from Article III constraints.  Of course, the availability of state-court 
standing will be cold comfort to an advocate if litigation is brought in federal court 
and it will typically be of little help to members of Congress.  In these 
circumstances, perhaps the best a court can do is to provide an accessible 
explanation of federal courts’ limited powers137 and to reinforce that fairness 
concerns, however powerful, cannot overcome the constraints of Article III.   
 
Countermajoritarian anxiety about deficiencies in the adjudication process and 
harms to judicial legitimacy if private actors and legislators cannot intervene to 
defend a challenged measure can be more readily addressed.  With respect to the 
process itself, amicus curiae status is already routinely granted to insure that courts 
receive a robust set of arguments and to enable at least some participation by those 
with a strong interest in the case.
138
   
 
While amicus briefs may be adequate in most circumstances, courts might also 
considering authorizing certain amici to participate more extensively in litigation.  
This “litigating amicus” status has long been available, at the discretion of district 
courts,
139
 to enable amici to engage in discovery and participate in trial, including 
by calling and questioning witnesses.
140
  Of course, allowing extensive 
                                                          
137
  See supra at xx and accompanying text. 
138
  In the many marriage cases that have been or are in the process of being litigated in the past 
decade, nearly all have had extensive amicus briefing.  [cite] Still, advocates who can intervene as 
of right must be permitted to do so, rather than being restricted to amicus status.  See, e.g., Utahns 
for Better Transp. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 295 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that right to file an amicus brief did not substitute for the right to intervene as party). 
139
 See, e.g., Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915, 917 (2d Cir. 1953) (stating that trial court’s decision 
regarding amicus curiae participation “lies wholly within the discretion of the trial court and is not 
reviewable”); Verizon New England v. Maine Public Utilities Com’n, 229 F.R.D. 335, 338 (D. Me. 
2005) (noting that the district court has “discretion to determine the fact, extent, and the manner of 
participation by the amicus”); Petition of Oskar Tiedemann & Co., 183 F.Supp. 129, 131 (D. Del. 
1960) (“The matter of intervention of amici curiae is solely in the discretion of the trial Court.”). 
140
  See Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin after the 
Friends Leave?, 41 Am. U. L. Rev, 1257-1258, 1256-1267 (1992); see also Samuel Krislov, The 
Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 71 Yale L. J. 694 (1963); Frank M. Covey, 
Amicus Curiae: Friend of the Court, 9 DePaul L. Rev. 30 (1959-1960); Michael J. Harris, Amicus 
Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of Friendship in American Jurisprudence, 5 Suffolk J. Trial& 
App. Advoc. 1 (2000); cf. Stuart Banner, The Myth of the Neutral Amicus:  American Courts and 
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involvement by amici risks inefficiencies and worse,
141
 but enough courts have 
granted litigating amicus status to suggest that careful management can control for 
these problems while maximizing the benefits from the additional participation.
142
  
  
Further, courts can – and already do – try to anticipate reputational backlash 
from potentially divisive decisions through the way in which they communicate 
their decisions.  Often, in difficult circumstances, courts take space at the outset of 
an opinion to explain that their judicial role requires them to do whatever they 
have done.
143
  We see much evidence of this in the marriage cases, where 
                                                                                                                                                                
their Friends, 1790-1890, 20 Const. Comment. 111, 130 (2003); [<-need to double-check whether 
these sources add value] 
 see also Russell v. Board of Plumbing Examiners, 74 F.Supp.2d 349, 351 (S.D. N.Y. 1999) 
(observing that “[a] court can allow amici to call their own witnesses and cross examine the 
witnesses of other parties” but also that litigating amici are “precluded from engaging in adversarial 
activities such as motions to compel” and from taking appeals”).   
141
  In a strong critique of a lower court decision to permit a litigating amicus, where the amicus 
had brought contempt claims against the defendant in the district court, the circuit court decried 
“this legal mutant characterized as “litigating amicus curiae,” and warned that allowing such status 
to non-parties “will implicate and erode the future core stability of American adversary 
jurisprudence as we know it today.”  U.S. v. State of Mich., 940 F.2d 143, 163-167 (6th Cir. 1991).  
The court added that allowing expanded amicus participation “would extend carte blanche 
discretion to a trial judge to convert the trial court into a free-wheeling forum of competing special 
interest groups capable of frustrating and undermining the ability of the named parties/real parties 
in interest to expeditiously resolve their own dispute and capable of complicating the court's ability 
to perform its judicial function.”  Id.  While other courts have expressed concerns about the 
litigating amicus role, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion is unusual for its energetic skepticism.    
142
  See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 820 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting with approval that 
“counsel for amici toured [the defendant’s] facilities, located and interviewed amici's expert 
witnesses, attended without participating in the depositions taken by the parties, actually 
participated in the depositions of amici's witnesses, and prepared pretrial memoranda on behalf of 
amici. Amici's counsel also presented amici's witnesses at trial and cross-examined plaintiffs' and 
defendants' witnesses.”); Alliance of Automobile Mfrs. v. Gwadowsky, 297 F.Supp.2d 305, 306-
308 (D. Me. 2003) (granting “amicus curiae ‘plus’ status, but with restrictions” including 
“requiring “notice and service of all documents and events just as if it were a party to the case” and 
some participation in discovery and at trial but excluding “an independent right to engage in 
written forms of discovery”); Daggett v. Webster, 190 F.R.D. 12, 14-15 (D. Me. 1999) (ordering 
that “all documents must be given to amici as if they were parties and amici have ability to, with 
witness’s acquiescence, examine or cross-examine a witness (as long as Attorney General’s office 
does not also examine or cross-examine”). 
143
  This anticipation of countermajoritarian backlash is particularly common when courts strike 
down voter initiatives.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans; [cites and additional discussion to come].  In 
decisions sustaining measures they find disagreeable, courts will often state that their decision does 
not endorse the wisdom of the challenged government action, or something along those lines.  See, 
e.g., Perry at 1073 (“It matters not whether federal courts think it wise or desirable for California to 
afford proponents this authority to speak for the State, just as it makes no difference whether 
federal courts think it a good idea that California allows its constitution to be amended by a 
majority vote through a ballot measure in the first place.”).  [more cites to come]   
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decisions frequently come across as though courts are apologizing to one 
disappointed constituency or another for the outcome.
144
  While this is no 
guarantee that those careful comments will reach the general public, which 
overwhelmingly learns about decisions from media accounts rather than from 
judicial opinions,
145
 it is at least a protective step that courts can take for 
themselves. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
At the end of the day, no matter how powerful the anxiety nor how wrenching 
the guilt that might flow from limiting private individuals and legislators’ 
participation, federal courts are simply not open-door institutions for dispute 
resolution, including for contentious legal and social conflicts.  Instead, to grapple 
realistically with intervention rules and Article III jurisprudence means that even 
the most enthusiastic defenders of challenged laws cannot alchemize a cognizable 
interest that their circumstances do not otherwise create.  Nor can they properly 
claim the mantle of governmental standing, no matter how willing the government 
is to share or delegate its access.   
 
Instead, federal courts are limited to authorizing amicus status for those whose 
strongest connection to the challenged measure is an intense interest either in favor 
or against.  And while federal circuit courts can virtually always hear appeals from 
governments desiring to defend their own laws, they cannot make space on their 
docket when it is only individual citizens or legislators who are seeking review, no 
matter how politically desirable that review might be. 
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  [cites to come] 
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  [cite] 
